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BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM UNDER THE IMPACT OF WAR

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A TRADE Union delegation from Russia has been in this country recently, touring round the principal war factories and exhorting the workers in them to put the last ounce of energy into the tasks of war production; and these visitors have been everywhere received with a lively enthusiasm which proclaims a sense of solidarity between the working classes of the two countries. These Soviet Trade Unionists, in the course of their study of our war economy, must have been struck again and again by the contrast between the position of the Trade Unions here and in the Soviet Union. For, under Communism as practised in Russia, the Trade Union machine is for all intents and purposes a part of the machinery of government. Its main purpose is not the protection of wages and standards of employment against a body of employers who are often reluctant to recognize the right of the workers to combine, and of whom some entirely reject that right, but rather to serve as the auxiliary of the State in increasing production and improving its quality, in order to make possible an improvement in the general standards of living.

Of course, even in the Soviet Union the Trade Unions have protective functions and do undertake the representation of the workers' grievances and claims. But this function is secondary; for Russian Trade Unionism is based on the assumption that real wage-levels must depend, not on success in extracting, by means of collective bargaining, a higher proportion of the total value produced, but on raising the level of production. It is assumed that the Unions want to help the State planning authorities and the factory managements to raise output to the highest possible level, and that success in this will necessarily raise the standards of life. The theoretical foundation of the Soviet system being that the State represents the workers, an economic order in which the State is the principal employer and there is no capitalist class to contend with means that the Trade Union has to regard itself as the

State's agent for helping to ensure in the factories the success of the public production plan.

Under war conditions, something not wholly different from this develops in the practice of Trade Unionism in Great Britain. At any rate since the fall of France, and to some extent even before that, the British Trade Unions have interested themselves actively in increasing output, especially in the war trades. So far from resisting the 'dilution of labour,' which they would have fought with all their strength in normal times, they have for the most part actively encouraged it, and have been ready to play their full part in training new workers to eke out the deficient supply of skilled men, even when, in doing so, they have been consciously raising up competitors who may gravely endanger their bargaining strength in the future. The Unions have shown great readiness to co-operate with the Government and the employers in measures designed to raise output: indeed they, or the Trade Union shop stewards in particular factories, have often taken the lead in pressing such measures on reluctant or conservative managements. This has been especially often the case since the Nazis launched their attack on the Soviet Union; and there is no doubt that the Russian alliance has greatly strengthened the will of Trade Unionists in general to contribute ungrudgingly to the war effort.

But, while all this is true, British Trade Unionism remains essentially different from the Trade Unionism of Russia. There are still big firms in this country—even big firms engaged on important war contracts, which refuse to bargain with the Unions and as far as possible prevent their employees from belonging to them. There are millions of workers in the war trades, as well as in other occupations, who have not joined a Trade Union. Trade Union membership in most factories is still a purely voluntary matter, at any rate for the main body of less skilled workers; and the cases in which membership is in effect a condition of employment are still comparatively few, outside a narrow range of skilled trades. Moreover, the workman, even if he is in a factory which is engaged 100 per cent. on government contracts and is under full State control, remains the employee not of the State but of the particular firm to which the factory belongs, and continues to think of himself as working for a private capitalist concern, even if he is willing, while the war lasts, to go all out to increase production in the public interest.

The basic psychology of Trade Unionism in Great Britain

thus continues to be a psychology of opposition, even though the practical expression of this opposition is for the time being largely in suspense. Indeed, this cannot be otherwise in view of the economic conditions under which the war is being fought. There is, nowhere written down but tacitly understood, a treaty at present between the parties which together compose the Government. The terms of this treaty are, broadly, first that the basic structure of the industrial system is not to be so changed during the war as to prejudge the post-war issue between capitalism and socialism, and secondly that, as a corollary, when the State has to intervene to control industry, it shall use capitalist agents for the control of capital, and Labour agents for the control of labour. This is the rationale of the ' Controls ' which exercise the State's functions in dealing with raw materials, machine tools, and other capital functions of production, and equally of Mr. Bevin's position at the Ministry of Labour and in the handling of the ' man-power ' problem as a whole. This is why we cannot, for the present or for as long as the treaty holds, have a really unified Ministry of Production; for such a Ministry would have to control both Capital and Labour, and the terms of the treaty forbid putting either a capitalist or a Labour man at its head, and thereby in effect prevent it from existing at all. Under the treaty, Capital must discipline capital, so Mr. Bevin cannot be Minister of Production; and Labour must discipline labour, so Lord Beaverbrook, when he was made Minister of Production, could not be given the powers over labour without which neither he nor his successor can possibly co-ordinate the productive effort.

This dualism reacts on the position of the Trade Unions. It has meant that, as far as has been possible, the State has stood aside from interfering with the relations between Capital and Labour, and has left them, as much as it could to be settled by direct negotiation between the two parties. It has not, of course, been able to avoid a good deal of interference. For example, it has been necessary to limit, though not to abolish, the right to strike, and to provide means of adjusting wages by reference to publicly appointed tribunals of arbitration. But even this has been done in such a way as to provide for arbitration only when the efforts of the parties to reach a direct settlement have failed; and with this goes the fact that the alternative tribunals which have been set up act not as the agents of any clearly defined policy laid down by the State, but at their own discretion, and are under no obli-

gation to follow uniform principles in their findings. There is, in fact, no public wage policy; and when, last year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer half-heartedly attempted to lay one down and to press for the stabilization of wages at their existing levels, this policy was speedily brushed aside. It was, indeed, bound to be brushed aside, if only because the existing levels of wages were quite irrational from trade to trade, and even in many cases from factory to factory: so that no good defence could be put up for keeping them all where they were. It would have been a different matter if the State had been prepared, for the duration of the war, itself to prescribe suitable levels of remuneration for the various grades of workers. But that would have run directly counter to the *semi-laissez-faire* assumptions on which the war is being conducted on the economic front.

For my part, I regard the unwritten treaty of which I have been describing certain of the consequences as inconsistent with the thorough mobilization of our economic resources; and I believe that it will have to be very greatly modified before we can win through. But in this article I am not discussing that issue, but only raising it to the extent necessary to explain the working of Trade Unionism under war conditions. In certain special cases, the State has been compelled to go much further than it has in most in regulating labour conditions. It has been forced to concede to builders engaged on essential war contracts a 'guaranteed week' of 30 hours—that is, a guarantee of 30 hours' pay irrespective of interruptions of work due to bad weather or other causes. It has been forced to constitute mobile bodies of dock labourers, working under special guarantees, to handle the large amounts of traffic diverted from the usual ports of entry owing to war conditions. In the case of agricultural workers, the need to keep a sufficient labour force on the land in face of the highly competitive demand for constructional and other war work has compelled the State to acquiesce in the raising of the minimum wage to £3 a week; but, even so, care has been taken to preserve the form of a concession made by the Agricultural Wages Board, in preference to a direct grant of the higher wage by the State itself.

Apart from special cases of this order, the Trade Unions are still left to make the running with wage and other demands, and to argue matters out with the employers, even where it is perfectly clear that the State will be compelled to foot the bill or, alternatively, to pass it on to the consumers. Accordingly,

the entire mechanism of collective bargaining remains in being, not much changed from what it was before the war, except that now reference to arbitration has become the normal sequel to a failure to agree. This, of course, tends to preserve the authority of Trade Union officials and executive committees and to make less likely the growth of unofficial 'rank-and-file' movements.

The dualism which I have noted pervades the entire machinery of the State for dealing with labour questions. The Government is advised by a general Committee and by a number of special Committees consisting of employers and Trade Union leaders in equal numbers; and in appointing area officers to handle such tasks as labour supply and inspection the attempt is made to balance every representative of Capital by a Trade Unionist, and *vice versa*, even when this is bound to interfere to some extent with choosing the best man for the job. Just as the Government itself rests on a balance of forces between Conservative and Labour Ministers, so must the organization of the labour factor in war production—or so the unwritten agreement seems to run.

It does not, of course, follow that the same principle is followed in the organization and control of Capital. No one has proposed that the 'Controls' at the Ministries of Supply and Aircraft Production shall be run by equal numbers of employers and Trade Unionists—or indeed that the Trade Unionists shall be allowed any look-in at all. That would be regarded as a violation of the term of the treaty which lays down that the structure of capitalism shall be left as far as possible intact; for Capital regards its exclusive control of industry, apart from the labour factor, as an inalienable prerogative. The claim of Labour to a share in control in this wider field does, however, come up in a different way; and it is at this point that the shop stewards' movement comes into the picture.

There is a marked difference in character and working between the shop stewards' movement which grew up between 1914 and 1918 and that which has developed during this war, chiefly since the fall of France and much more rapidly since the Soviet Union came into the conflict. The shop stewards' movement during the last war was mainly an organ of workers' defence and opposition, and identified itself only in a few places with the struggle for higher production. It was concerned, if not with preventing dilution, at any rate with imposing limiting conditions upon it and with guarding the economic inter-

ests of the workers who might be prejudiced by it. It engaged actively in the struggle for improved wages and conditions; and it fought hard battles against the repeated 'combing-out' of the munition factories for fresh batches of recruits to the armed forces. In practice, it became, as a movement, increasingly 'anti-war,' as the needs of the armies called for increasingly stringent measures to release men for the army and to make full use of substitute labour. It was thus in opposition, both economically and politically, to the Trade Union leaders who were supporting the war effort; and the hostility between the two forces was often acute.

The situation during the present war has been very different. Although many Trade Union leaders, mindful of past experience and fearful of a renewed challenge to their leadership, were for a long time—and some are still—disposed to look at the shop stewards' movement askance, there has been in its practical activities little or no warrant for their suspicions. The movement has made strides during this war mainly, not as a protector of working-class conditions, but rather as the advocate of a more intense productive effort. It has seconded, or gone beyond, the Trade Union leaders in positively advocating dilution of labour; and it has devoted a large part of its energies to pressing, workshop by workshop, for more effective measures designed to increase production by every possible means.

This is a remarkable fact, eloquent in itself of the keen sincerity with which the leaders of workshop opinion are behind the war effort, but at the same time raising certain acute problems which impinge directly on the unwritten treaty to which I have referred. The desire of the shop stewards, as representatives of the workers, to have a say in all workshop matters which affect the pace of war output involves a claim to intervene in many concerns which employers have always regarded as the exclusive prerogative of themselves or of the managers whom they appoint. The managers, acting as the appointees of capital, have for the most part taken the same view; and accordingly the attempts of shop stewards and workshop committees to tell managements how to run their works better have often been received with coldness or even resentment. Some managers have been prompt to realize the advantage of securing from the workers a co-operation in raising output which could never have been secured by them in time of peace. But many have been very hesitant about accepting this co-operation, and not a few positively hostile.

Employers, too, have been conscious that, if they once grant the claim of *their* workers to range over the entire field of management, it may not be easy to revoke so far-reaching a concession when the war is over, or to accept it without economic prejudice when the State is no longer waiting to buy everything they are ready to produce. Accordingly, the efforts of the shop stewards to help in increasing output are seldom received with unqualified thankfulness, and are often met with deliberate stone-walling, and sometimes with absolute repudiation.

The State itself, on account of the 'unwritten treaty,' is in a difficulty in dealing with these offers of help. Only now is the recognition of workshop machinery being made compulsory even in establishments which are directly owned and managed by the Government; and even now there is no compulsion—except in aircraft production, to which the system is just being extended—on firms which are working entirely on Government contracts to establish or recognize similar machinery. This may come, if the pressure for it is strongly enough sustained; but enforcement of such recognition would run counter to the general principle of letting the employer manage his labour relations in his own way, and would, even now, meet with extensive opposition.

Consequently, the position of the shop stewards' movement differs immensely from factory to factory, the governing factors being the personalities on the two sides. A strongly led shop stewards' organization can force the pace where one more weakly officered would fail; but even a strong movement may hit up against a manager who is radically opposed to any interference by the workers with 'managerial functions,' or against a board of directors which is strongly hostile to such interference, or even to Trade Unionism in any shape.

It has, of course, to be allowed for that, even if the shop stewards are devoting their main attention to measures which they regard as calculated to increase production, many of their leaders also hold strong views about the right of the workers to share in the 'control of industry,' and see in the war situation a chance of furthering their own economic objectives while helping on the war effort. It must also be admitted that in many factories the shop stewards form rather a self-constituted 'ginger group' than a leadership fully accepted by the whole body of the employees. The Communists, especially since the entry of Russia into the war, have strained every nerve to acquire positions of vantage in the local shop

stewards' organizations; and they have been pretty successful in many places. Being a shop steward is an unremunerative, and often a hard and thankless, task; and there is often little or no competition for the job. This means that the keen man can jump in with the acquiescence of the main body of his shopmates, but often without their full support in a positive sense. There are wide variations in the degree of real representativeness of the shop stewards in different works and departments; and sometimes the movement stands rather for an energetic and politically minded minority than for the whole body of those whom it professes to represent. This enables reluctant managements or boards of directors to stand out against it more easily than they could if it were more broadly based; and the narrowness of its basis in some factories is often used as an argument against full recognition of it in others in which it rests on broader and firmer foundations.

These, however, are only qualifications of the general statement that in recent months the shop stewards' movement has been advancing very fast both in power and in popular support. It is undoubtedly the vital form in which the working-class demand for a share in the 'control of industry,' thwarted higher up by the influence of the 'unwritten treaty,' is making itself felt; and it seems clear that its influence is destined to grow as the 'man-power' shortage becomes yet more serious, and as the need for intense effort to raise production to the maximum becomes even more decisively recognized.

I feel no doubt that, on this occasion, the shop stewards' movement has come to stay. It was snuffed out with comparative ease after the last war, when shortage of labour turned into redundance and it became a simple matter to sack anyone whom the management regarded as a nuisance. The office of shop steward then became so dangerous to hold that there were soon few candidates; and the institution died out, except in places where Trade Unionism was exceptionally strong and depression not too acute. The conditions of labour redundancy in the war trades may, of course, reproduce themselves after the present war; and, if they do, the shop stewards' movement will have a trying time. But it will be much harder to make an end of a movement which has associated itself closely with the promotion of workshop efficiency than it was to liquidate one which had been mainly concerned with politico-economic opposition, and with the defence of specific labour

interests, without showing any particular zeal for the improvement of the quality of productive organization.

To a very considerable extent, in the main factory industries, the future of Trade Unionism seems likely to depend on what happens to the shop stewards' movement. The Trade Unions largely established their present position, and consolidated their influence, by concentrating on a fairly narrow range of questions, among which by far the most important were the establishment by means of collective bargaining of standard rates of wages and overtime payments and of a standard working day and week. These are still immensely important issues; but the growth of mechanization and mass-production, accompanied by a great spread of piecework or other forms of 'payment by results,' has increased the relative importance of those conditions of employment which cannot be settled by collective bargains applying over whole districts, but must be adjusted factory by factory, or even workshop by workshop within a single establishment. This tendency means that, over and above the district and national bargaining machinery maintained by the Trade Unions in the past, there is increasing need in these days for distinct provision for the striking of workshop bargains, relating to the conditions which are peculiar to each individual factory. This need clearly calls for the recognition of Trade Unionism inside the workshop, as well as over a wider field; and it provides an obvious opportunity for the shop stewards' movement, having established itself under the favourable conditions of war, to consolidate its position in the post-war industrial system.

Such consolidation, however, implies a much closer relationship than exists at present between the shop stewards and the district and national machinery of the Trade Unions. The Unions, as we have seen, have commonly been reluctant hitherto to delegate any part of their authority to the shop stewards —beyond the mere duty of spreading Trade Union membership —because they have feared that the recognition of workshop machinery might undermine their own power. But it will be difficult to sustain this attitude if the shop stewards succeed during the war in consolidating their position as bodies closely concerned with the efficiency of factory management, and having a right to be consulted about it. At the end of the last war, the shop stewards were reluctantly granted, by way of a small representation on the district committees of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, for example, a sort of official

Trade Union recognition. But this principle was never carried at all far; and, as the shop stewards' movement disintegrated during the post-war years, it came to have less and less practical meaning. I feel sure that this recognition will have to be carried a great deal further in the future, if Trade Unionism is to have any chance of effectively representing the main bodies of less skilled workers in highly mechanized establishments, or indeed of holding its own in face of the changing technique of production and of the shift in the balance of employment between the old, basic industries and the newer, diversified industries which cater for modern consumers' needs.

Let me come back, in conclusion, to the point with which I began. Russian Trade Unionism is much less an engine of working-class defence than an instrument of State policy. This is because, in Russia, working-class defence has become a political objective of the State itself, and the main industries are administered under public auspices in pursuance of a public plan designed to raise production to the highest possible level. If conditions comparable with these exist in our own industries after the war, our Trade Union movement will doubtless undergo a transformation similar to that which the Russian movement has experienced; and in that event the war-time activities of the British shop stewards' movement will be found to have contributed largely to this process of transformation. But, in any event, I believe the changes in British Trade Unionism are likely to be considerable; for even on the assumption of a continuing capitalism, large changes are overdue. The adaptation of Trade Union machinery in this country has lagged a long way behind the alterations in the structure and processes of industry; and the movement needs to be organized, in view of these alterations, very much more on a workshop and factory basis, with much fuller provision for positive participation by the workers in the mechanisms of factory control. Very slowly, the need for this is being recognized in official Trade Union quarters; and war conditions are hastening this recognition, which has been further stimulated by the counsel of the Russian visitors, with their widely different experience and their habit of regarding the Trade Unions as the State's auxiliaries in promoting workshop efficiency.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET-BRITISH COLLABORATION

By H. Foster Anderson

A RECENT debate in the House of Commons on the policy of the Government produced what to many a foreign onlooker must have seemed another example of the illogical nature of the English. For while it was the Conservatives who supported the action of sending supplies to the U.S.S.R., it was the Labour and Liberal members who seemed to hold the view that the safety of the British Commonwealth should have been the first consideration. These speeches were followed in Moscow but it is doubtful whether they caused the Soviet Government to revise its opinion of the Left wing in British politics. In all probability they confirmed the view of the Russians that the form of the English outlook, which unconsciously moulds public opinion in every section of the community, is essentially imperialistic.

Moscow, however, has been empire-making equally as long if not longer than has England. At the time of Elizabeth Ivan the Terrible ruled over territory considerably larger than the original principality of Moscow. The Russian Empire has been a steady growth and not the spectacular but short-lived effort of consciously planned expansion. Where lies the cohesive force of its unifying action is difficult to discover. For since the outset of Moscow's contact with western civilization, ambassadors, visitors, Hanseatic merchants or trade delegations, have reported to their respective headquarters that the state of Muscovy was in such a condition of decomposition that its further survival would be a matter of a few years. Their observation of the facts may have been correct but their interpretation was wrong for in spite of misrule, waste, recurring invasions and defeat in war, the Russian Empire grew. And it has not stopped growing.

Thus the substitution of Soviet Russia for France at the post-war equivalent of the conferences in Paris will not be merely that of one country by another. It will mean the

appearance of an empire-making outlook distinct from that held by the other participants in the reconstruction of Europe. The Versailles Treaty was the work of men inspired by an ideal, called democracy. In reality it was the English empire-forming spirit, which in the past had united the different peoples of England, Wales and Scotland, had consolidated the various racial elements in the U.S.A., and had made co-operation possible between Afrikanders and British in South Africa. The representatives of this cohesive force dominated the conferences in Paris. They identified their common outlook with that of all men of goodwill. This, they believed, was not the outlook of the English speaking peoples. It was the human view of the nature and aim of political life.

Such an identification of one standard of values with the views of the whole of humanity, so that it implies the goal of universal assent, is an essential feature in an empire-forming spirit. And it is inherent in the Russian view of life. Neither they nor we regard nationality as the ultimate aim of political activity. Nothing less than some world-wide union will satisfy the aspirations of each. One result of this similarity of an aim of world unity is that the European is both mystified by and anxious about the Soviet-British rapprochement. He is mystified because the English seem to be blind to the real nature of Soviet Russia. He is anxious because for him nationality is something supreme in itself and he begins to suspect the English of not having at heart the same political ideals as he holds. Moreover the European knows that the English have a traditional aversion to commitments on the Continent so that if they do not believe in nationality, they may not be whole-heartedly against a supernational ideal other than their own superseding the national structure of Europe, provided, of course, that it does not get too near the Channel ports. Indeed in stating their ultimate aim of a world-wide unity both the Russians and the English rid it of any national origin for the one calls it the Communist International while the other declares it to be the rule of Democracy. Only to the European is this a piece of Machiavellian diplomacy. Both the Russians and the English are equally sincere in thinking that they have got past the narrow limits of a purely national outlook. Unconsciously each view identifies itself with that of the whole of humanity.

At first sight it may seem that Soviet Russia and the English speaking peoples are attempting in a hidden way the very

thing that they condemn in Hitler, namely, the ultimate conquest of the world. Yet this common condemnation is not because the National Socialists are trying to secure a world order. It is because the kind of order that Hitler would impose, would be a thing of evil. Whatever differences may ultimately exist between the Russian and the English views of life, each has one and the same basis assumption which unites them to destroy the attempted world domination by a spirit fundamentally opposed to each. This basis assumption can be expressed in what appears to be a mere tautology, "All men are men." That it is not a tautology becomes apparent when the German principle is stated, namely, 'Only Germans are entitled to the rights of man, the rest of the species is subhuman.' From this follows that a German world order would not be a super-national organization. On the contrary the world would shrink to being one nation in control of everything and everybody.

To destroy the power animated by the debasing view that the whole of humanity except the few are to be deprived of human rights, Soviet Russia and the English speaking peoples are at one in their efforts. But when this has been completed, further collaboration will depend on a clearer understanding between the two peoples. At present the only interest each has in the other is the purely practical one of the nature and extent of the help being rendered to defeat the Germans. We are thankful that a ruthlessly planned economy is giving Soviet Russia the means to sustain a great counter-attack and the Russians are more interested in the output of British factories than in the overthrow of a capitalist system. Even when the need for help in a common war effort has passed, the interest of each will in the main be of a practical nature. We shall want the Russians to help us to do something and they will want us to help them to do something. And this something will among other things be the post-war reconstruction of Europe. Thus there are three questions, what do we want of Europe, what does Soviet Russia want of Europe, and what does Europe want itself? To answer these questions involves an effort to grasp, if possible, the inner structure of the Russian empire-making spirit and the cohesive activity of the English attitude to life.

The Russian Empire started outside Europe. According to tradition the Christian faith was adopted not by missionaries converting the heathen but by a Tzar making a reasoned choice

from a number of religions offered. Church and State became fused into a unity and have remained so to this day. Uniformity for the Russian was and is a spiritual necessity since it is his conception of the structure of order. His fanatical hatred of anything in the nature of non-conformity explains that paradox in his character. He has more genuine love of his fellowman than has anyone else yet he is capable of acts of ruthlessness that can appal the outside world. Failure to realize the Russian's need for uniformity has given rise to the misinterpretation of his religious nature under the Tzars and a similar misinterpretation of the atheistic character of the U.S.S.R. Such judgments have been made by Europeans little realizing that they have taken for granted that the State and the Church are two distinct activities in the life of citizens. For this reason these judgments are false. The State and the Church being identical for the Russians under the Tzars, to have been irreligious was an act of treason. To overthrow the Tzarist régime the Bolsheviks were forced to attack religion and when they became the governing power to have been religious was, if not an act of treason, at least suspicious. Freedom of conscience is allowed in the U.S.S.R., but freedom to form a Church, that is, a great religious organization, is prohibited. This is not because the Communists are anti-religious in the European sense of the term. The Russians are simply incapable of understanding an order which is a union of dissimilars each having in some way its own particular sphere of human activity. For them ethics, mysticism, practical life and the state are fused into one complete unity.

Moscow started on its course of empire-making with this "complete" attitude to life where all the forces of man's nature are welded into one indiscriminate whole. Indiscriminate is the cardinal feature. There are no sharp distinctions or clearly opposed contradictions to be reconciled. As there is no division between rendering to Cæsar and rendering to God, so the line between "thine" and "mine" is blurred. Property is a function rather than a reality having rights in itself and individuality shares the same nature. While the European view of life demands freedom in order to reconcile the opposing duties as to State and Church, to self and others or to nation and humanity, the Russian limits duties to the whole which contains the total of man's varied nature.

But one has no right to call the Russian outlook totalitarian, Germany and Italy are totalitarian because, nurtured as they

have been by European civilization which is based on the constant struggle to reconcile the duties to Cæsar and to God, they declare that all, the total, must be rendered to Cæsar alone. Germany repudiates European civilization and attempts to destroy it. The true basis of totalitarianism must be held clearly in mind if we are not to fall victims of the new propaganda of Hitler, namely, that he is the defender of European civilization fighting the menace of the Russian non-European way of life. The sinister feature of this propaganda is that it is a half-truth which is always more dangerous than a complete falsehood. It is true that the Russian way of life is not European but it is false that Hitler represents European civilization. The totalitarianism of National Socialism is a denial of the basic structure of Europe. On the other hand though the Russian way of life is non-European it contains in its own peculiar way the same belief that ethics are essential to man's nature and that God as well as Cæsar is an aspect of social and political activity.

It is worth noting that Hitler has changed his ostensible aim from being a fight against Communism to being a fight against Russia. By doing so he has shown himself again to be a master of propaganda. In the minds of most the term Communism denotes the most radical form of socialism which in turn conjures up visions of state control and planned economy. But the stress of war and the vastness of post-war reconstruction has made it apparent to many that modern civilization demands in increasing measure a new economic structure in which planned economy will play a large part. Hitler is shrewd enough to sense the trend of affairs in the economic world. This does not mean that we are approaching the general rule of communism but any departure from liberal free trade carries with it the tinge of communism. So Hitler changes his ground from the economic to the political world for he knows that the opposition of Europe to Russia is no mere modern trend of history. It has several centuries behind it.

Of singular interest in this respect is the short-lived history of the Independent Baltic States. The Esthonians and the Letts had been serfs for centuries under the Baltic barons but from their masters they had received first the Catholic faith and then with the Reformation they became Lutherans. Whatever meagre training they had received, it was European in origin and tradition. When their chance of freedom came,

they had no memories of past glories as a nation like the Poles. They were very ordinary people who wanted to be free to conduct their affairs in their own manner. So they fought both the Germans and the Russians. They drove out Communism because, having lived for many generations under Tzarist rule, they recognized Communism for what it was, a Russian national movement. Since 1939 the Baltic States have lost their independence. If in the post-war reconstruction of Europe they are to be included in the U.S.S.R., the ultimate fate of Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians can be reasonably determined. The Russian view of life does not recognize any intrinsic rights in the individual or the nation. As it permits freedom of conscience but denies the right to organize a Church, so it permits the use of any language but suppresses any national organization. For these reasons Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians will be torn from their country and dispersed throughout the U.S.S.R. where each will have the right of any Soviet citizen to find the level to which his abilities entitle him. He may retain his native tongue but he will not be allowed to organize a native land.

The British Empire started in Europe and is based on European civilization. The long struggle between Emperor and Pope during the Middle Ages created with the Renaissance and the Reformation two specifically European conceptions, namely, the individual and the nation and these in turn carried on the traditional contest in the struggle to reconcile the claims of the one with the demands of the other. The whole essence of the European view of the structure of order is that it is an adjustment between opposing demands and nothing could be more intrinsically European than the view of the function of opposition in the House of Commons. The German *Weltanschauung* is decisively non-European and it has shown to the world the necessary consequences that follow from an initial total rendering to Cæsar. It is order achieved by elimination. First goes God, then opposition, then the rights of the individual and finally the nation is destroyed. Everything Europe has taken a thousand years to create is to be blotted out.

Moreover the European view of the structure of order as an adjustment of opposing demands implies that within the whole there are parts having some rights in themselves. The individual in some way is a reality in himself and so is the nation. Order is the reconciliation between the demands made by each.

And this type of order, as opposed to the Russian view of life as a fused whole, has produced its own special form of international order. It is the Commonwealth of free nations, each having rights in itself and each having to reconcile duty to nation with duty to other nations, thus carrying on the traditional European struggle which started between Emperor and Pope, became that between the individual and the nation and now goes forward to a new struggle to reconcile the demands of the nation and of the Commonwealth.

Collaboration between Soviet Russia and England is not only desirable but possible. Yet such collaboration can take place only when each clearly recognizes the difference in points of view and respects that of the other. Knowledge of the cause of disagreement can clear the way to the field of agreement in a common policy. Each has a fundamentally different conception of the structure of order. The Russians believe order to be that of an indeterminate whole fusing all the aspects of man's nature in one vague but powerful uniformity. The English believe order to be the adjustment between the claims of unique parts which make up the whole, and parts having certain rights in themselves such as the individual or the nation. And each type of order, the Russian and the English, has in it the possibility of gaining universal acceptance. Such universalism in all probability is a thing of the distant future. But post-war reconstruction may indicate which of the two has the greater power of expansion.

One thing seems to be certain. Russia will emerge from this war with its people proud of their strength, confident in their future and certain that their way of life is not only a blessing to themselves but would be to the whole world. But the Russian Empire is a thing of steady growth. For the time being those in charge of its destiny may decide on a period of repose to regain the strength so ceaselessly given by the people during the twelve years previous to the war and so courageously outpoured in the present struggle. The Russians have no need to be in a hurry. They are certain of themselves and of their future.

But have we the same confidence in our view of order, an order which believes in the rights of the individual and the freedom of nations? A view of life that aims at universal acceptance but makes no further effort in that direction admits that it is unfit for all. Is the Commonwealth of British Nations and the emergence of the Commonwealth of American nations

the limit to the vitality of the English spirit as the vanguard of European political constructiveness? Or are the English speaking nations going to help the nations of Europe to create their own particular commonwealths? The test case will come when the frontier of Soviet Russia in the west will be decided. The Baltic States are symbolic. No people trained in the European traditions can accept the Russian way of life. To hand over any European population to the U.S.S.R. will mean their eventual liquidation as Europeans.

Such an emergency may not arise at the post-war conferences since it is more than doubtful whether Russia wants from Europe anything more than a set of conditions which will prevent Germany from making again a savage and powerful attack on her. For Germany to go Communist may deceive quite a number of people but it would not throw dust in the eyes of the Russians. It would be the old German trick of dividing Germans into good ones and bad ones to escape punishment. Moreover the Russians believe that the Communist system is the most efficient form for the modern state and the last thing they want is an efficient Germany. Russia does not want anything from Europe except that it will not be strong enough to attack her. She has plenty to do and enough resources of her own to do what she wants, namely, to give one hundred and sixty million people the highest standard of life in the world. Russia may accept help but she will not need it after the war.

But what do we want of Europe? Many of us would like to be in the position of Russia of being able to turn our backs to the Continent. Yet a small island supporting forty-five millions cannot afford to have an impoverished continent. We have to make up our minds what we want of Europe.

What does Europe want itself? In all probability no one united Europe will emerge from the war but regional and economic groupings; Latin, Balkan, European-Slav, and Scandinavian. Collaboration with Russia may come in the economic sphere since Russia will need the products of the secondary industries which she had not time to organize. Everything will turn on the atmosphere at the conferences. Russia will hold the leading cards. She needs the factory products of Europe but equally well she can do without them if she so decides. And more will be gained by trusting to her humanitarian streak than by commercial bargaining.

It is a Utopian idea to believe that after the war Russia will

disarm. Her very existence to-day depends on her clear realization in the past that defence is the first concern of a nation. Communism in Russia never suffered from that false assumption of socialism in the west that the total income of the country could be devoted to social services and a high standard of living. The English speaking nations will probably reduce their armaments to below safety level. In this case all Europe will sooner or later unite. For no country will wish to live by the grace of Russia.

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OUR CHINESE ALLY

By Sir Frederick Whyte

ON July 7 the war in China will enter its sixth year. It broke out on a large scale at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, though it may truly be said to have begun in 1931 when Japan opened her Manchuria campaign with the bombing of Chang Tso-lin's train outside Mukden. Judged on either scale, and certainly in the operations since 1937, it was the first act in the drama of our own world war; and the resistance of China bids fair to have a powerful effect on the ultimate result.

China's power in war was rated low by friend and foe alike. The comparison between the war potential of the two combatants in the Far East, reckoned in material resources, in organization and in discipline seemed to leave no doubt that Japan must win with comparative ease. So axiomatic did this conclusion appear to be that the Japanese General Staff themselves failed to examine their strategic task and embarked on operations against China without defining their objective: or, it may be truer to say that their appreciation of their campaign made no allowance for those factors which have enabled the Chinese Armies to foil their opponents at every turn in the struggle. Relying on superior power, and operating with command of the sea, Japan reckoned on a short war. No one in Tokyo foresaw that the Japanese Army would be powerless to bring the Chinese to any decisive engagement; nor did any Japanese forecast accurately appraise the cost, either in time, or in actual expenditure or in casualties. In all three, the event has proved that Japan went to war against China in a confident mood in which she committed the strategist's cardinal sin of undertaking an unlimited liability and made the sin more heinous by underestimating the power of her opponent.

Doubtless the Japanese Staff have a good excuse. Who would have supposed that China would still be firm on her own feet, with her main armies in being and the spirit of her people undaunted, after she had lost her entire sea-coast, had seen her capital fall into the hands of the enemy, and with it all resources and wealth of the Yangtse Delta? Who indeed?

except those who knew China, who bore in mind the size of this unlimited field of war and understood the nature of the combatant terrain in the hinterland. Who again, except those who had realized the recreative power of the National Movement which had made China anew? In a word, who but the Chinese themselves? And they knew all these things. The whole world knows them now too; and if we are rightly surprised that the Japanese (of all people!) ignored them, may not the reason be that the root of Chinese survival lies in those moral factors which the Axis Powers have not yet learned to reckon at their supreme value. Japan, the sedulous and apt pupil of the Machine Age, believed that the power of her war machine must overwhelm the less mechanized Chinese; and, failing to understand both the physical and still more the moral limits beyond which the "machine" cannot overpower the "man," she is now ruefully driven to acknowledge that all her Chinese conquests do not spell victory, and that their cost has reduced her resources to a point where her power to sustain a long war on the new maritime and continental scale against the A.B.C.D. powers is not great enough.

Not great enough, that is, unless her Far Eastern successes contribute to the shortening of the whole war by enabling the Axis in Europe and Africa to win soon: *or*, unless they so materially replenish her own inadequate and partially consumed resources as to enable her to face a much longer struggle. We may surely say, without incurring the charge of a sanguine complacency, that the first alternative is not to be realized. However serious we must reckon this, the third crisis of the war, it does not portend the final defeat of the Allied arms; for the Axis Powers as a whole do not to-day enjoy the unchallenged control of the initiative (except in the Far East), and the reinforcement of the Allied Powers, both actual and potential, by American participation in the war ought to assure the final result. The second alternative, by which Japan would gain new resources from Malaya and the East Indies, is not so favourable as it may appear at first sight. If the Japanese victories in South East Asia had rewarded her with the possession of its material wealth intact, we should have to acknowledge that she had thereby repaired her chief weakness and enabled herself to confront the Pacific war with better assurance of success. May I refer the reader here to my own *Japan's Purpose in Asia** for an estimate (made five

*The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

months *before* Japan went to war against us) of her general capacity as a belligerent? Granted an inevitable margin of error, that estimate showed where Japan was weak and why she must regard a long war with apprehension. In her new position controlling Malaya and depriving the Allied Powers of the raw materials of South East Asia, she can claim to have made a considerable breach in *our* sources of supply. But, on the facts as known, it is very doubtful whether she has reaped any decisive gain for *herself* in respect of the sinews of war. The Dutch have put their oil fields out of action; and the supplies of tin, rubber and other commodities actually in Japanese hands, *and immediately usable*, are far less than she hoped to acquire. Therefore her material gains are moderate.

So much for these territories conceived as the reservoirs of a war-effort. It remains to estimate the effect on the defence of China of their now being in Japanese hands. Up to December 7, Japan had been deeply engaged in a continental war in China with no decisive result in sight. It must have been evident to the strategists in Tokyo that the assault on China could be pursued no farther along the lines followed since 1937. Chiang Kai-shek's Government was secure at Chungking behind a formidable barrier of mountains, and the attempt to force the passage of the Yangtse gorges could not be made. The alternative was to cut all the communications between Chungking and the outside world and thus to complete the isolation of China already partly achieved by the control of her sea-board. These communications had their sea termini on British territory and therefore could only be cut by war with the British Empire. This diversion of the direction of the Japanese attack from the frontal assault on an impregnable Chinese hinterland to Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies would serve the general strategy of the Axis far better than the continuation of the campaign in China. It would embarrass Britain by compelling her to divert part of her war effort to the defence of her Eastern possessions: it might also compel the United States to pay more attention to the Pacific than to the Atlantic. Thus we may assume that at the very moment when the Japanese General Staff were searching for a new way to break the expensive deadlock in their Chinese war, Hitler re-doubled his pressure on them to attack the Western Powers in the Pacific, with the results which are written in temporary Japanese characters all over the map of South-East Asia.

How much farther Japan will have carried her campaign against the Indian Empire before this article is published it is impossible to say, nor is any good purpose served by speculation on events to come. But since we are more concerned with the avenues by which supplies can reach China, we can make some estimate of the effect on them which Japan's advance has wrought. Normally China is supplied by sea, the main ports of entry being Tientsin, Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy and Canton. One by one these have been closed by Japan, leaving China to rely on points of entry on foreign territory such as Saigon and Rangoon. The former fell into Japanese hands after the defeat of France, and the latter is now also closed. This means that the Burma Road no longer serves Chungking, and China has to rely on the long overland route entering from the north-west for such material as the Soviet Union can spare. The only alternative route lies through North-Eastern Bengal and Assam: and when Chiang Kai-shek on his recent visit to India spoke of the "second string to his bow" which could be used if the Burma Road were cut, he must have been referring to this possibility. The ports of entry are Calcutta and Chittagong from which there is communication by rail almost to the border of British Indian territory up the valley of the Brahmaputra to Sibsagar and Dibrugarh. In normal times this route would never have been considered; and, when the war broke out, it did not exist at all. But these are not normal times, and when needs must, a way is found. The obstacles to road-making are even more formidable than those surmounted in the completion of the Chinese link of the Burma Road itself. The mountain chains stand athwart the road: there are few towns or villages which might make convenient stages for road traffic, and throughout the summer the rains are heavy, Dibrugarh having an average of about one hundred inches a year. But, since similar obstacles were overcome in completing the Burma Road, they can be overcome again. With coolies by the tens of thousands, and the devil of war to drive them, we may yet see this route at work. For all I know, the sinews of China's war effort may be passing along it already: by rail from the delta in southern Bengal, by road across the frontier, and thence by mountain path, river and road to Chungking! The western road-engineer may say that it couldn't be done; but China has her own ways of doing things that seem impossible, therefore the miracle may be performed.

The secret of this miracle, as of other feats executed by the Chinese, lies in the new spirit of the people. We know ourselves what stout-hearted men can do to defeat the utmost malice of the enemy; but we have in our hands a great wealth of material resources and a highly organized State to guide us, whereas the Chinese are worse off and were caught in the middle of their great national reorganization when Japan fell upon them. Their task of national defence was therefore all the greater, their equipment so much the less. Yet despite all handicaps, they survive and defeat all Japanese attempts to crush them. We have already noted certain features in the character of the battle field which operate in their favour. We have seen how the mechanized forces of Japan reached a point in the mountains where the wheels of her war machine could not revolve; we have read of the unremitting warfare of the Chinese guerrillas which has inflicted daily casualties on the Japanese; we have watched the reorganization of the Chinese Government in Chungking after its successful retirement up the Yangtse from Nanking, and we have also seen how millions of refugees from occupied China have been transformed overnight from a burden into a productive asset in their new homes in Szechwan. That refugee movement alone is one of the epics of China; and when we remember that, despite the turmoil and disarray of such a human flood on the move, the people were able to take many of their tools and implements with them, the fact stands out as unique among human achievements. Workshops were packed bodily in junks, machinery was dismantled and borne in barges towed by those sturdy little Upper-River steam-craft that served the needs of Szechwan in times of peace. And thus much of the industrial equipment of the Wuhan cities—the Chicago of China—was shipped six hundred miles further west to work for China at war. The Yangtse Gorges are a sight to remember at any time; but never have they presented such a moving scene, set in the precipitous frame of their majestic cliffs, as during the time of this great migration.

Here was proof, if proof were needed, that the Chinese can look after themselves, which is only a homely way of saying that they have the fundamental capacity for self-government. This faculty they have always possessed, but only in our own time has it come into action in the field of national endeavour, as compared with local affairs. One of the most striking features in Chinese history is the contrast between the effective

power of unorganized self-government shown by the Chinese and their complete failure to demand a form of government which would give expression to public will in national affairs. Thus the Chinese, while successfully maintaining their local autonomy, always regarded " politics " as being the specialized occupation of a privileged class, commonly called the Mandarins, the public officials of the Empire. China's long history has shown many popular movements arising to overthrow the dynasty; but each of these successful revolutions was merely followed by the substitution of a new dynasty for the old. It was not till the opening years of the twentieth century that the Chinese conceived of a possible political alternative to the authority of the Throne; and therefore the national revolution of our own time is unique in Chinese history, not because it was a popular revolt, but because the people had found a new objective. This new aim, embodied in the programme of Modern Chinese Nationalism, was derived from the West, in about equal proportion from the French Revolution and from the European and American Liberal Movements of the nineteenth century.

The first contacts between China and the West were indeed made long before the nineteenth century opened: but at first they were confined to trade relations in the sea-ports and the first Europeans to settle in China were mainly engaged in commerce, and had little or no thought of a political purpose. None the less, as happened in India and elsewhere in Asia, the Western trader, whether he knew it or not, brought with him an indispensable cargo of ideas more important than the goods and products of Europe. These ideas and especially those of a political character, implanted themselves in the Chinese mind and led the educated Chinese to pursue them to their source by coming to Europe and to America for study. Thus it may be said that the birth-place of the Chinese Revolution was the universities and colleges of the Western world; and it is no accident that the spear-head of the national movement has been the young Chinese student. It was not till Sun Yat Sen assumed leadership of the movements that its real meaning became clear to the Chinese themselves; but it was already under way long before that, and Sir Robert Hart surveying the scene of the Boxer Rebellion from the British Legation in Peking described what he saw as " a movement new in Chinese history."

The Boxer Rebellion, like the greater Taeping Rebellion 50 years before was originally an anti-dynastic movement of the

usual Chinese kind. It was read by the Chinese themselves as a sign that the Mandate of Heaven was exhausted and that the Ching dynasty (commonly called by us the Manchu Dynasty) was near its end. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 began as a movement against the Empress Dowager; but that skilful and shrewd old woman succeeded in diverting the attack from the dynasty to the foreign powers. And, as is well known, the Rebellion itself ended with the success of the Allied European Forces as the terms of a new settlement were dictated to the Imperial Government. The result of this was in the first instance to secure for foreign interests an even stronger position than ever; but its true consequence was to reveal to the Chinese themselves the weakness of their own government and to redouble their efforts to equip China with the instruments of modern power.

The Manchu Dynasty had revealed itself incapable; and by 1911 it had disappeared from the scene in the face of a revolutionary movement which originally broke out in Western China in that year. But as noted above, this new revolutionary movement was not merely concerned, like its historical predecessors in China, to teach the dynasty a lesson, but to find a new form of government altogether. Therefore the true significance of Sun Yat Sen was that he was the prophet of a new era, through which China is still passing.

Sun Yat Sen took " government of the people, by the people, for the people " as the watch-word of Chinese nationalism. His purpose was to establish a Chinese Republic. He embodied the purpose of the Republic in the three Principles of the People, the well-known *San Min Chu-I* which were (1) Nationalism, or the government of the people; (2) liberty, or the rights of the people; (3) livelihood, or the welfare of the people. Realizing that this could not be achieved over-night he designed the time-table of progress in three parts:—

(1) *Militarism*: by which he meant that there must be a period of military conflict before the Republic could be established, in the course of which the Armed Forces of the Revolution would have to destroy the Imperial Power, the latter then surviving in the form of War Lords as the legacy of the defunct Empire;

(2) The second part in the time table was described as *Tutelage*, in which Sun Yat Sen foresaw that it would be necessary for the party, the *Kuo Min Tang*, or the Chinese Peoples Party, to become the self-appointed Government of the country and to provide the first rudiments of public administration under the new order. This closely resembles the theory of Soviet Russian politics; and

it may be said that though Sun Yat Sen learned most of his political lessons in the West, he obtained many of his ideas from Moscow, and indeed at one period owed much to Russian assistance;

(3) The third period was to be full self-government, by which time the Proletariat was assumed to have been trained in the period of tutelage for its democratic task.

The first two periods tended to run together. For the purpose of the Civil Wars, that is, the period of Militarism defined by Sun Yat Sen above, the Nationalist Party assumed from the first such national control as it was able to seize. The period from 1911 to 1923 was one of such confusion that, although the foreign powers continued to recognize the first of the national governments set up in Peking, political power was rapidly passing to more revolutionary armies in the south. Thus in fact it may be said that the story of the Nationalist Movement, as we have known it, really begins with the creation of Sun Yat Sen's administration in Canton in that year. At that time Sun Yat Sen himself hoped and believed that he would find in Britain and America the indispensable foreign assistance which his movement required. But his hopes were disappointed and he turned to Lenin and the Moscow Government. During the next three years Sun Yat Sen's Government in Canton was mainly engaged in consolidating itself and in preparing for the campaign northwards which filled the years from 1926 to 1928. Sun Yat Sen himself died in 1925 before this campaign ended; and on the date of his death it was universally recognized that the period of Civil War or Militarism had a long time to run before the Nationalist Party would be able to devote itself to the essential tasks of administrative reconstruction. During this Canton period, Borodin, General Galen and other Russian experts exercised great influence if not actual power. It was on Borodin's advice that Chiang Kai-shek, then a very young officer in the Nationalist Army, was made Commandant of the Whampoa Cadet School, which was the Officers' Training Corps of Sun Yat Sen's armies.

The choice of Chiang Kai-shek showed great shrewdness of judgment in Borodin, and has had incalculable consequences for China ever since. In the Chinese Civil War Chiang was to prove between the years 1926 and 1929 that he was first and the rest nowhere. He established his personal ascendancy in the Nationalist Movement by his outstanding quality as a military leader and then proved both in fighting and in diplomacy that he had no equal in China. One by one he defeated

all his rivals and thus laid the foundations of the supreme position in which he now stands.

If it be said, as it must be said, that in the present circumstances of China's fortune, the General is the incarnation of the people's will and purpose, the growth of the people themselves in national stature must be recognized as the outstanding factor in a decisive period. Traditionally careless of politics, thinking more of themselves as a Race, and not of China as a political entity capable of becoming a Great Power, the Chinese are now turning their unique qualifications to the task of making China a National State of the first order of importance. The outbreak of the present struggle with Japan caught them half-way in this process; and it is certain that one of the Japanese motives in launching the attack which began in 1931 and is not yet over, was to prevent China from organizing herself and her resources in such a manner as to become a possible menace to Japan herself. The Sino-Japanese struggle has therefore delayed the fruition of Chinese hopes; but whatever be the outcome of the struggle, the welding influence of danger from without has completed the process of patriotic unification already well advanced by the National Revolution itself.

The Chinese Nationalist Movement offers to British observers an interesting contrast with the Nationalist Movement of India. Both are derived from the same source. In each case the impact of Western civilization has provoked changes in Asiatic life, both in the economic and in the political habits of the people. India has reached an advanced stage in the growth of nationhood under the tutelage of Great Britain. China has achieved her half-fulfilled purpose mainly by her own efforts. These two interesting cases of Asiatic reaction to Western civilization are not easy to compare, they are in fact to be seen in contrast rather than in similarity. The national qualifications of China are very different from those of the Indian. The path by which each has reached the present stage is radically different from the other, but fundamentally they represent facets of the same twentieth century problem which will remain to be solved after the war is over. The rôles of East and West have hitherto been those of pupil and teacher in the political and economic field; but henceforth the strength of the National Movement in both countries will show that the temporary subordination of the East to the West is practically a thing of the past and that a partnership on more equal terms than anything hitherto prevailing is the goal of the future.

WOMAN IN NATIONAL SOCIALISM

By Ernst Klein

WHEN the factors responsible for the triumph of National Socialism in Germany are examined in this country and in the United States, all sorts of points are raised —the national and religious disillusion of the German people, especially of its youth, the social conditions which found their most dangerous expression in the gigantic figure of more than six million unemployed, and the sentimental mysticism deeply rooted in the German soul. But one of the most important is never mentioned: the influence of the feminine element in the German upheaval. It may not have been ultimately decisive, but it is absolutely correct to state that Hitler could never have gained power against the opposition of the German women. In their devotion to him they were far more fanatical than the men.

Hitler-enthusiasm had got hold of the women in all social and cultural classes. His worshippers could be found in the drawing-rooms of the rich and the noble, the studios of the intelligentzia, in the country towns among the shopkeepers and in the villages among the peasants. In the upper classes, for the greater part thoroughly reactionary, there was hatred and contempt for the régime of the Weimar Republic. The ladies of the *Junkers*, of the officers, of the financial barons and industrial magnates resented the wives of the Socialist ministers being received in the homes of the foreign diplomats and driven around in cars. I was once in Danzig, just after Stresemann had become Chancellor. With a Swedish colleague I was invited to lunch in the house of the first Vice-Mayor of the city, Dr. Ziehm. Naturally the table conversation turned to politics and to Stresemann. The Vice-Mayor said contemptuously: "How can one have dealings with that man? He is married to a Jewess." Madam the Mayoress added: "How can the diplomatic circles in Berlin accept this woman as the representative of Germany! A Jewess!" In the words of her husband there were bitterness and contempt, but in hers envy and hatred.

It is a fact that the women of post-war Germany were more easily infected with the poison of anti-Semitism than the men. Perhaps the explanation for this can be found in the character of the German woman. It is hard and proud, strong and bellicose and not without a streak of brutality, even of cruelty. Far back in German mythology the character of the woman reveals itself in a peculiar hardness and harshness. Whereas the goddesses of Olympus were lovely, easy-going creatures, the deities of Valhalla presented themselves as females who could fight, ride and drink as hard as any man. The Germans adored that broadhipped, muscular Valkyrie Brunhild who could throw the heaviest javelin farther than any masculine athlete and could defeat every male adversary in wrestling matches.

The storm-whipped lands of the North Sea and their primeval forests produced a people who knew little of natural beauty, of sun and warmth of soul and body. In fighting the hardness and cruelty of their native country they became hard and cruel themselves. Whereas the Hellenes offered their gods flowers and danced before their altars, the Germans tried to win the goodwill of theirs by offering blood sacrifices, not only of horses, but of human beings. To honour their war loving gods, they organized athletic meetings and afterwards drank themselves under the tables with Meth, a bitter and strong brew made of barley. Olympus drank the golden wine Nektar. The difference between Nektar and Meth is the difference between the German world and the South.

When the first German tribes emerged from their dark and wild forests into the beauty of that Southern world, the Roman soldiers were even more frightened by the women whom the barbarians brought with them than by the men. Standing on their chariots, holding children in their arms, they drove their men with fanatical cries into battle and death. When the men were defeated or killed, the mothers slew the children and afterwards themselves lest they fell into the hands of the victors. Autocar, wireless, aeroplane, permanent wave and lipstick have not altered this original character very much. German women still belong to a nation which regards war as the sublime occupation of a race and believes in might as the basis of right.

It is true that hero-worship is not an idiosyncrasy of German women only. They share it with their sisters all over the world, because it forms an important part of feminine sexuality which is rooted deeply in the human soul.

The worship with which Germany's womanhood hailed Adolf Hitler comes beyond doubt out of the same mystic psychological underground as the adoration of Christ by the nuns of the Middle Ages. Hitler was the Messiah sent by Providence to lead the German people to glory and greatness. Women always take things personally and thus the German women hailed not the *message* of National-Socialism so much as the *person* of the Messiah who preached it. Hitler was "*Herzog Widukind* who on a white stallion rides through the German forest."

On the evening of January 30, 1933, thirty-thousand S.A. men marched with glaring torches along the Linden and through the Willhelmstrasse in triumphal homage to Hitler who had been appointed Chancellor on that very morning by the old Marshal. In the window of the President's Palace stood Hindenburg stone-faced and immobile like his own monument. In the window of the Chancellery, the building next to the Palace, stood Hitler, smiling and joyously returning the salutes of his people. Hundreds of thousands of them were in the streets, yelling like a people gone stark mad. Their enthusiasm however was not meant for the hero of Tannenberg, but for the *Führer*. The wildest of them all were the women. They had massed themselves under the windows of the Chancellery and indefatigably waved their Nazi flags and handkerchiefs. Many of them had brought their children with them. They lifted them high up and showed them the glorious figure of the *Führer*. "Look at him! Look at him!"

You could, if you felt like it, excuse them on the grounds of mass psychology. But then came the day on which Hitler's victory was celebrated in Potsdam, the stronghold of Prussian reaction, with all that splendour which Nazi propaganda knows how to display on prominent occasions. In the Garrison Church, the shrine of Prussianism, the *Reichstag* assembled, with all its ministers, its generals, with all the representatives of foreign countries. Hindenburg and Hitler laid wreaths at the tomb of King Friedrich II and the Austrian deserter afterwards made the dedication speech. In honour of the solemn moment he wore a frock coat, stiff collar, and striped trousers—probably for the first time in his life. One could see that he was uncomfortable. He looked ridiculous. Beside me sat an old lady, the widow of a lieutenant-general, as she informed me. Trembling with joyful emotion, she pointed out to me the military personalities presenting themselves in the glory of their war decorations. "Look there is

Mackensen! That is Hammerstein, Heye . . . . See how happy they all are! The Social democrats and the Jews have gone! The old glorious time has come back!" When Hitler mounted the pulpit and his harsh, rough proletarian voice filled the church, the Prussian *Junkers* held their breath to hear him. Stiff, with his usual impassive face, Hindenburg sat in his fauteuil. "Isn't he wonderful?" whispered my old lady. "Who? Hindenburg?" "Oh no! Hitler!"

A friend of mine, high up in the ministry, one day told me the following story: "One of my colleagues, Councillor Z., has a seventeen-year-old daughter who was going to celebrate her birthday. The parents asked her what she would like as a present. "I can't tell you," was the rather astonishing answer. The parents, disturbed by the strange behaviour of the child, persisted until the daughter revealed her birthday wish: "A child by Hitler!"

Certainly, there were millions of women in Germany who did not share this hysterical adoration of Hitler. There were many women with Jewish friends who not only refused to give them up but risked their own safety to help them. Also there were women who had the moral courage not to surrender their children to the Hitler Youth or the *Bund Deutscher Mädels*, who even refused to join the *Deutsche Frauenschaft* to be taught how to breed cannon fodder for the *Führer*. But these brave women were easily overwhelmed by the ruthless brutality with which the Nazis deliberately destroy family life in Germany. In the Hitler Youth the children were taught that it was their duty to the *Führer* to turn against their parents if they did not agree with the principles of National Socialism. Robbed of every means of defence these German mothers had their children taken away from them.

The Nazis knew how to deal with women who dared oppose them or refuse them their children. In 1938 the gaolers of women's concentration camps at Lichtenburg in Saxony, and at Revansbrueck in Mecklenburg turned hoses with ice-cold water on them. One of the most infamous cases of Nazi barbarism against women was that of Maria Janowska a former Municipal Councillor of Berlin who was dragged in the night from her home, taken to the Columbia House where Gestapo prisoners were being dealt with, stripped, thrown on a table and beaten to death with sticks.

The fact that the majority of German women so enthusiastically gave up to Adolf Hitler their children, their families, their freedom, even their religion is the less understandable as

Hitler's National Socialism from the beginning turned against them. They readily renounced all the material and political equality of rights which the Weimar Republic had granted to them. National Socialism boasted to be a man's movement. In 1930 when the last legal elections to the *Reichstag* took place, 37 female members were elected out of a total number of 577 deputies. No woman disgraced the *Reichstag* of Hitler's making. No woman was allowed to hold a public post. All women's organizations were dissolved and replaced by the *Deutsche Frauenschaft* under the leadership of Frau Gertrud Scholz-Klink, that ample-hipped Brünhild whom the *Führer* himself had deigned to call the "ideal German woman."

In a speech to the Women's Congress of the Party rally on September 8, 1934, Hitler showed them their place by saying: "We do not consider it right that the Woman should intrude into the world of the Man. We consider it natural that the two worlds should remain separate . . . the contribution the Man makes to his nation's struggle, the Woman makes in maintaining the individual cells of the nation . . . Every child she brings into the world is a blow struck in her nation's struggle for existence."

But Hitler was preparing his wars. The more this work became intensified the more the Nazis found themselves in need of labour. They began conscripting women for work on the land as well as for industry. As far back as June 29, 1939, State Secretary, Dr. Syrup, of the Ministry of Labour had pointed out that the *Reich* possessed in its women a reserve of three and a half million workers who could be mobilized in case of necessity. Three months after this statement compulsory labour service for unmarried women between 16 and 50 was introduced and thus the legal basis for utilizing this reserve created. In the first place assurances were solemnly given that there was no intention of calling up woman power on a large scale, but very soon its mobilization turned into ruthless exploitation. It is true woman labour power is used to the limit in other countries too. Compulsory conscription has even been introduced, for instance in this country. Yet there is a fundamental difference between Germany and other countries in the basic principle of the question. Neither in Great Britain nor in any other civilized state where women have to do their part in war work, have they been submitted to such social and even cultural degradation as in Hitler's Germany. But now the war forced them to change their tune

and to-day it is the ideal of the "working woman" which is propagated.

Hitler has even had to allow college women to come into their own again. From the start National Socialism had tried to close the gates of University study to them. In 1932, before Hitler became lord of the destiny of the German nation, there were 19,600 women students in German universities. The next year this figure was diminished by 7,000. In 1938 it reached its lowest level with 8,995. But in July, 1941, it had mounted again to 18,300. Hitler needs educated women for all sorts of higher and even scientific work now, such as the direction of courses for wounded soldiers, for air-raid precautions, for service at the 'plane detectors. Women in England are used for the same work, but for them such occupations do not involve a change in social position. Never having been degraded they have not to be elevated again.

Slowly German women are allowed to retake their places in the social structure of their country. The questions arise: Have they forgiven the humiliation which was imposed upon them by National Socialism? Have they forgotten the contemptuous words of Hitler which he thundered years ago? The culminating question is: German women helped to bring Hitler to power; will they also become the instruments of his downfall?

One must not expect the German women to stand up in open revolt against Hitler. They did not do so against the Kaiser in whom they believed far less. He was never regarded as a Messiah, but Hitler is, and will be for a long time to come. Nobody outside Germany can estimate how fanatical that belief is which the German people, and especially the women have in Adolf Hitler. With him stands and falls National Socialism. There is another fundamental side of the character of the German women to be taken in account. They are no revolutionists. There are no *tricoteuses* or *petroleuses* in Germany. French women had the élan of the revolutionary spirit. The German women have not. There are no heights and no depths in their history and their character is as hard and proud as it ever was. Their patriotism is absolutely narrow-minded, without any understanding of foreign nations. Hitler with his devilish cleverness has succeeded only too well in filling German woman with hatred of all that is not German.

When I went to Berlin in 1919 I met women of all social and cultural classes and not one of them wanted to believe that the German armies had been defeated on the field. The Germans

felt themselves not only abandoned by their Emperor, but also betrayed by everybody else. The whole country was impoverished. It was incredible how spiteful and envious the German women were against the foreigners to whom they had to let their homes. It is true that they had to face the bitterest national disillusion and humiliation after four years of sacrifices and sufferings. It is furthermore true that the victors went back on their promises and did everything possible to deepen the hatred of the German people against them. One must not forget that these women of the first world war are the mothers of the German women of to-day. They are the mothers who surrendered their children to the Hitler-Youth.

There are more materialistic bonds which tie the German women so strongly to the fate of their Messiah and his political party. Hundreds of thousands of them have husbands who have well paid jobs in the organization of the Party and who were elevated to influence and wealth. The organization of the Nazi-party is so closely interwoven with the whole structure of social and even family life in Germany that it appears nearly impossible to throw it over. Yet will not the inexpressible sufferings of their husbands, sons and sweethearts have a sobering effect on their minds? Will not those ultimate sacrifices which Hitler is exacting from them open their eyes? Some time ago there were reports in the neutral press about demonstrations by outraged Austrian women who protested with the cry: "This we have to thank the *Führer* for!" against desolating food conditions. Another story came recently from Berlin where women are said to have thrown themselves on the rails at the Anhalter station in order to prevent two trains with reservists for Russia to leave. They refused to move and S.S. men fired machine-guns at the women.

Is this the beginning of the end? Certainly, there is unrest among the German people, but that does not yet mean that their morale is breaking down. News from neutral sources still proves that German women especially—although not so enthusiastically as before—willingly and obediently carry the heavy burden which their *Führer* has laid on their shoulders. Why not? Did he not so far fulfil his promise and make Germany master of Europe? Did not his victorious armies send home immeasurable booty? Of the atrocities committed by them against Polish and Czech women not one German woman has been heard to protest.

Now that news of overwhelming victories with booty is not

coming any more, now that instead of receiving fine fur coats from Russia German women must give up their own coats and even their last woollen stockings, they are told another National Socialist truth: Germany has to fight for her very existence. The whole world under the leadership of the Capitalists, the Jews and the Bolsheviks has united against her and her *Führer*. Therefore Germany has to stand by him to the very last. And—incredibly as it may appear—the German women believe that too.

That fanatical belief in Hitler and his mission must be shaken to its roots. How is this to be accomplished? The German women must be shown that he is not infallible; not the superman they believe him to be. Propaganda by the B.B.C.? Not enough. Bombardment of German towns? Of Berlin? Not enough. The German women must receive the most thorough object-lesson of the terrors of the totalitarian war which their *Führer* has been waging upon the world. They have not yet heard the roaring of the monster tanks. They have not yet seen their homes burnt down, their most cherished possessions looted. They have not had to flee in headlong panic into misery as the women of the other countries overrun by the German soldiers have had to do. They have not yet seen gallows erected in their towns.

A cruel and merciless medicine, but absolutely necessary if the belief of the German women in their Messiah is to be broken for good. Once this is done, his hypnotic power over the German people is broken. Once the women have lost their belief the men will follow them. The end will come. What shape it will take, nobody is able to tell. Perhaps Germany will become the scene of the bloodiest civil war the world has ever seen. Perhaps if the democratic powers occupy in time the most important cities of Germany it might be possible to avoid a chaos which would endanger the whole of the Continent.

But whatever happens afterwards Hitler has first to disappear. If the German women are to take their part in this overthrow, they must be convinced that their race is not a master race, destined to rule the world. They must not be allowed to go on believing in Messiahs who ride in armoured cars and preach hatred and robbery. Otherwise they will hail the next *Führer* whom the "Grace of Providence" sends to the German people as ecstatically as they hailed Adolf Hitler.

PARTNERSHIP WITH INDIA?

By W. Horsfall Carter

IN less than four months Japan has toppled down the whole pyramid of power on which Britain's Imperial sway east of Suez has been based. Our relations with Australia-New Zealand, remotest element of the "far-flung" Empire, can never be the same again. But because, like Canada—for whom geography ordains a common destiny with the rest of the North American continent—the Pacific States will henceforth, from the point of view of strategy, be revolving within the orbit of the U.S.A., that does not necessarily mean a severance from the British realm.

India's future is more problematical. The relationship of this country with that vast sub-continent where the 'steel frame' of British administration has been imposed can likewise never be the same again. Incidentally, as with Canada, the economic basis of our mutual relations has shifted—by the end of 1942 India will have repaid all outstanding public debts. But here we are dealing with a far-reaching revulsion from alien rule, which alters the whole complexion of the problem. When we take pride in the development of the free association of the nations of the British Commonwealth we have to remember that our statesmen were dealing with primarily British communities—the people guiding the destinies of those overseas countries looked at life in much the same way as we ourselves. In the case of India, as with Ireland, there is the continual pother about British "imperialism"*—there is no magic in the formula of 'Dominion Status,' and its constant incantation has too long masked a psychological conflict which is at the root of Britain's failure hitherto to satisfy Indian aspirations. Until we adjust our minds to the Indian approach, I suggest, nothing that the British Government can "offer" India in the way of political concessions will avail to stem the current that flows away from us.

*Mr. Edward Thompson observes in one of his writings—Someone in India once asked: "What is an imperialist war?" The answer was: "Any war in which Britain is engaged." Congress in its manifesto of September 14, 1939, talks of India as "the outstanding example of modern Imperialism."

The sending of a Special Envoy to India, with the War Cabinet's new plan, is an imaginative stroke which *may* prove as decisive as Mr. Churchill's great broadcast claiming Russia as ally on June 22. With Japan at the gates, as the Prime Minister says, the willing co-operation of Indians of all classes and creeds is the primary condition of the land's successful defence: that sentence from the dispatch of *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian* correspondent on Malaya—"The Government had no roots in the life of the people of the country" is ringing in all our ears. Not, of course, that any constitutional *settlement* can be sought now. What may be—must be—achieved is an interim working arrangement which takes account of the imponderables no less than the obvious material factors and thus gives promise of efficient collaboration between Indian leaders of the calibre of Jawaharlal Nehru and British official elements now and in the future. The repetition of past pledges, which is all that the Government has provided hitherto, is beside the point, as is also the sort of appeal "to forget domestic differences" which was made by the Viceroy at Calcutta on December 15. We make far too much of the Hindu-Moslem conflict as an excuse for standing pat. There is a previous question that demands an answer, and Mr. Churchill's statement in the House on March 11, was not altogether encouraging. To hark back to the Government statement of August, 1940, which met with a chorus of disapproval in India, at the same time placing the onus of agreement on the Indian political groups, alas! reflects the chronic blind spot in the British mental outlook, an apparent incapacity to distinguish between the things of Martha and the things of Mary.

British policy was well described by Sir Herbert Edwardes as long ago as 1861 as one of "first fitting India for freedom and then setting her free." There has never been any divergence of aim: the Morley-Minto reforms, the Montagu-Chelmsford recommendations, the Government of India Act of 1935—all indicate, in the words of the Declaration of 1917, "the progressive realization of responsible government." Lord Irwin when he was Viceroy in 1929 was more explicit in his affirmation that "the natural issue of India's progress is the attainment of Dominion Status." Latterly this pledge has been more than once elaborated as meaning —when Indians have settled their differences—'all powers of a self-governing State within the British Commonwealth.' In the recent House

of Lords debate the Duke of Devonshire, speaking for the Government, re-affirmed that

> the political issue in India to-day is not whether power shall or shall not be transferred from British to Indian hands—that was settled years ago. The issue is what Indian Government or Governments are to take over.

Two points should be noted, however: (1) Britain claims to retain the right in her wisdom to say *when* India is fit to be free; and (2) Britain takes for granted that a self-governing India will remain a member of the British Commonwealth—no longer a dependency but, nevertheless, subordinate in law, if not in fact to Parliament in London. It is a natural enough presumption on our part—*but* it begs the whole question. (The *right* to secede—cf. the Herzog attitude in South Africa in 1926—is regarded as the badge of freedom.)

Englishmen, that is to say, being essentially pragmatists, are thinking all the time in terms of practical government, of function; and, conscientious to a fault, they are mindful of their immense responsibilities towards the voiceless millions of India's peasantry, of the manifold internal differences that will have to be adjusted—of their treaty relationship with the rulers of the Native States and so forth. At the same time they betray an incorrigible *de haut en bas* attitude, a *Herrenvolk* "complex," so to speak, which comes out in many other ways besides the 'colour bar.' It is difficult for Indians to realize that the same sort of superior aloofness will be found frequently in the Englishman's relations with his fellow-Europeans (for example, any 'British colony' in a European capital!), but this seeming arrogance must be particularly galling since Indians of the educated classes, like the Chinese, in their secret hearts look upon Europeans, not merely the British, as of inferior culture to themselves.

The educated Indian, I suggest—be he Hindu, high-caste or low, Moslem or ruling Maharajah—is by nature fundamentally concerned with considerations of right, of *amour-propre*—that *izzat*, a combination of emotion, pride and self-esteem in which reason plays no part—for which there is no equivalent English word. Thus since first the flame of Indian "nationalism" was kindled by Japan's victory over Russia, and the emergence of the 'Union of South Africa,' the passionate urge behind the demand for home rule, for "independence" has been essentially a spiritual, non-political impulse—a perfectly natural desire on the part of Indians to run their own show. And the

point is that the politically conscious Indian postulates an *equality of status* which our politicians and administrators (and most of those who speak or write about 'the Indian question') with majestic insouciance consistently deny. Lord Irwin alone ever got near this fundamental Indian aspiration when he wrote in a State document of "an India rightly conscious of her self-respect." This preoccupation with status is primary, and until some British statesman has the imagination to appreciate the fact, there is nothing to be done about 'India' as a problem in practical politics. For that reason, of course, it was a Himalayan blunder for the Government, in Whitehall, in September, 1939, to declare India a belligerent without consultation, without supplying any opportunity for Indian opinion to express itself. Though enjoying separate representation in the League of Nations, though she has an Agent in Washington, who recently put India's signature to the declaration of purpose of the United Nations, India in her relations with London is made to feel that she is an object and not a subject of policy. India was omitted from the scope of the Balfour declaration of 1926, excluded from the provisions of the Statute of Westminster, while the Act establishing an all-India Federation was so hedged about with safeguards that the "grant" of responsible government was largely nullified.

It is quite remarkable how the declarations and murmurings of discontent that have been heard from India in recent months harp on this theme. First of all there was the appeal by the Indian Moderates and Liberals, including three members of His Majesty's Privy Council, sent to Mr. Churchill in Washington. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and his colleagues asked the Prime Minister

> to realize the urgent necessity of transforming the entire spirit and outlook of the administration of India by making a declaration that India will no longer be treated as a dependency ruled from Whitehall

and, after indicating four necessary measures to be introduced immediately, in the concluding passage returned to the charge with their emphasis on India being placed now "on a footing of absolute equality with the other anti-Axis Powers." On February 21, *The Times* quoted Mr. Rajagopalachari, the able ex-premier of Madras and a Congress leader, as saying:

> India asks not for a constitution but for freedom. Other questions and what the constitution should be are subsidiary, and will be easily answered if Britain will give an answer on the main issue.

And he went on to express the hope that the forthcoming

declaration of future British policy would, above all, indicate that the British Government has specific plans for bringing Indians into equal partnership with the British people at the earliest possible date after the war. Then, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Moslem premier of the Punjab, in an interview on March 5, hoped that the declaration will "make the status of India as a free and equal partner in the British Commonwealth . . . clear and beyond doubt." A similar statement was made to the *Manchester Guardian* by the Moslem premiers of Bengal and Sind, two provinces where the existing Constitution is functioning normally. Leading business men have endorsed the demand for equality of status now. Sir Chunilal Mehta, retiring president of the Indian Federation of Chambers of Commerce, declared in his speech at the annual meeting:

> Without an early satisfactory settlement of the political deadlock the imagination of the common people could not be touched sufficiently to enable them to face the ordeals of totalitarian war. The most rigorous and efficient bureaucracy would hardly serve as a substitute for a genuine popular leadership.

The redoubtable Mr. Jinnah himself, on behalf of the Moslem League, has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that, in words used by the Calcutta correspondent of *The Times*, "Indians be allowed to feel it their own war by being brought right into the responsibilities of Government." The Moslem League, that is to say, is ready to work with Congress now within the framework of the present Constitution, without prejudice to the major political issues involved in the framing of the future constitution. Nehru himself, while contending that Britain's immediate step should be the formation of a provisional National Government, responsible to the Indian people, declares that "the question of minorities does not arise in the present crisis . . . This war is a vast revolution ushering in an order that will be entirely different."

That is clear enough. It is perfectly true, as these statements I have quoted show, that the obsession with status shades off easily enough into this or that political demand. Thus the clamour for "recognition of India's right to direct representation in the Imperial War Cabinet—if one is established—in all Allied War Councils and at the Peace Conference,"* to which Britain would appear to have bowed by Mr. Amery's announcement of February 12, is found on closer examination to carry with it a corollary that the appointment

*The words are those of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and his 12 co-signatories in the message from Allahabad.

of any such representative of "India" shall be made by a central Government "responsible to the Indian people"—and not by Viceroy and Council, still less the India Office. (One demand on which there is virtual unanimity, of course, is for the abolition of the "discredited"† India Office and the vesting of its present functions in the Government of India directly responsible to the Crown). But the point I am trying to bring out is that the only condition for maintenance of the British connection in the long run—and the only valid "safeguard"—is a solemn declaration by Britain now of "honourable and equal partnership" such as Mr. Gandhi, for instance, has for years been demanding. India may well be, as was wittily said once by William Gerhardi, rather like a young girl in the frame of mind that she feels she can neither live with nor without her mother. The family metaphor, however, which suits well enough the case of the transplanted 'Anglo-Saxon' communities, is dangerously misleading with regard to India. There is, it is true, seen from our angle, the identical process of emancipation, and, the conferring of "latchkey" status. But, actually, the relationship is far more complex, and the prospect of retaining India ultimately, under the British Crown far less certain. A device similar to the 'External Association' formula of Mr. de Valera, on the face of it would seem to be more likely of acceptance as a "just and final solution." We have the examples of Egypt and Iraq where satisfactory relations have been achieved by a treaty partnership.

It is time these things were said because even our most enlightened proconsuls go on talking in terms that miss the whole essence of the problem, putting the cart before the horse. Lord Lytton, for example, in a letter to *The Times* published on March 4, conceives "Dominion Status" purely and simply as a constitutional goal and as a boon or privilege, analogous to the grant of citizenship under the Roman Empire, to be conferred on an all-India Commonwealth *after* all the knotty political problems have been solved. As a statement of the strictly *political* task waiting to be done Lord Lytton's letter is admirable and deserves quotation at some length. He says truly:

> . . . it is not merely a problem of reconciling the interests of Moslems and Hindus, but of combining the Indian States with the self-governing Provinces of British India. This fact is ignored in all the speeches and letters on the subject either here or in India. No Government

†Sapru in another statement.

> which failed to secure the support of the Indian Princes and the fighting races, as well as that of the business community, could become responsible for the administration and defence of India as a whole . . . Only under a federal constitution can the whole of India be united, and it is for the separate Indian-governed units to agree upon the form and powers of the federal government at the centre which they will accept.

It is common ground that the particular Federal system which was evolved after laborious discussions at the Round Table Conferences has never come alive—though certain of its features were working satisfactorily before the Amending Act of 1939 pulled back into the Viceroy's hands the powers of self-government being exercised in eleven Provinces of British India. Why? Primarily, of course, because its British authors had not really reconciled themselves to the idea of equal partnership. The Imperial Power, through Parliament and the India Office, had retained a tight hand on the bearing rein: in these days one-fifth of the human race cannot be indefinitely coerced from a distance of thousands of miles away. Partly because Congress, obsessed with the "obsolete controversy"* of Britain versus India—has not yet faced up to the essential part to be played in an all-India Federation by the Native States. Congress, imbued with the word-juice of nineteenth-century nationalism, with its continual gabbling of the shibboleths of democracy, has contributed not a little to the existing constitutional deadlock (cf. the clamour for "responsibility at the centre") by confusing what is really a spiritual ferment—the urge for India's self-expression and equality of status—with a political conception. And actually, of course, Hindu-Moslem differences have been accentuated and magnified out of all proportion by the mirage of *Swaraj*, each group seeking to manœuvre itself into the position where it may expect to derive the greatest benefit from the succession. Factional conflict is indeed largely a by-product of the chemistry of revolt against the British Raj. Inside the Native States, where the population is equally mixed, the communal issue, practically speaking, does not arise. But, fundamentally, I would suggest, the political malaise is due to a slavish insistence on the forms and pattern of Parliamentary democracy for Central and Provincial Government machinery among peoples to whom the tradition of Cabinet Government is an alien, imported tradition.

*Edward Thompson's phrase.

Without going into details let me enumerate certain stubborn realities which, I suggest, have too often been overlooked.

(1) India is, *pace* her most vocal sons, not a nation in the European sense at all—though the physical and economic unity wrought by the British has endowed her with all the appearance and many of the forms of a nation. Here is a sub-continent, as large as Europe without Russia, composed of many different races in varying stages of development: a mosaic of autonomous States ruled by Maharajahs and the like and British-Indian Provinces that has been supported hitherto on the world's stage by the girders of the 'steel frame.' Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the Urdu poet of the Punjab, was not far wrong when he said in his presidential address to the All-India Moslem League in 1932 that "to base the constitution on the conception of a homogeneous India or to apply to India the principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for civil war."

(2) The problem of an all-Indian polity is how to devise some new political pattern which will take into account the existence of a number of federating units administered according to British ideas (the present British-Indian Provinces) side by side with 'quasi-sovereign' Indian states—who would be responsible still to the Crown as represented by a Governor-General (assuming, of course, that India retains the link with Britain). The Indian States, undoubtedly, are in the position of making a federal solution of the Indian problem possible. No democratic fervour can alter the *fact* of personal rule, the prevalence, in some cases, of quasi-feudal conditions in Indian India. But that is no obstacle to the achievement of a federal system—any more than the existence of several European States where Parliamentary democracy has never really worked was regarded as rendering impossible a European federal union, such as M. Briand and others advocated.

(3) The only framework into which India's essential diversity can be appropriately fitted, I suggest, is precisely this popular nostrum of 'Federal Union'—impracticable in Europe because of the political nationalism of the units. It is not suggested for a moment that the great work of physical unification done by Britain should be undone. Thanks to our sheer administrative capacity the whole of this vast area has been gradually knit together into a single unit in respect of communications, coinage, defence, etc., in fact the essential federal services. Similarly the needs born of scientific progress and economic interdependence had endowed the world with a number of international administrative unions which carried on the world's business free from political passions long before there was ever such a thing as a League of Nations. The World Postal Union is the prototype. As for the institutions necessary for a federal system for the Commonwealth of India, I suggest many ideas could usefully be borrowed from the Geneva League of Nations—there was nothing wrong with the machinery established there. Council, Assembly,

> Minorities Commission, etc. may all find their counterparts in the federal structure of an all-Indian Commonwealth.

Under some such federal scheme as the one I have outlined the present British-Indian Provinces would, of course, become independent units of statehood. And, since they were in their origin administrative units, there seems to be no bar to a well-considered re-adjustment of boundaries so as to obtain a closer approximation to racial and religious unity than exists at present. (Territorial modification of the Native States areas, "concentration" of Indian India in fact into thirty or forty effective units represented in a States' Chamber, is likewise a *sine qua non*). The Simon Commissioners, we may recall, who knew their India, perceived the necessity of breaking up the present unitary pattern and investing the at present subordinate provinces with the status of autonomy. This reform is in line with all the best thought on the subject—*vide* the speech by Lord Hailey in the recent House of Lords debate.

There is no suggestion that the 90-million strong Moslem element of India could be properly regarded as a "minority." Indeed, under such a federal scheme as I have adumbrated, there is no reason at all why something in the nature of the Pakistan scheme for a group of Moslem States should not take shape. Better that than a continuance of the separate electorate device which places a premium on communal rivalry. Lord Zetland has described 'Pakistan' as "not far short of a counsel of despair." But confronted by a peculiarly intractable problem of "two nations within a single State" in Lord Durham's words (though here, of course, the term 'nation' is misapplied) Britain has more than once in the past had to accept solutions that are anything but ideal: for instance, the Partition of Ireland, the Peel Commission's recommendations for Palestine —and the separation of Burma from India. In any case this matter is surely one for Indians to settle among themselves, not for us to decide.

I have always thought that the most satisfactory definition of Indian "nationalism" was that supplied by Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar in an address to the Indian Liberal Federation in 1930:

> the vindication of India's right to grow into the larger life of the future in her own way and according to her own traditions and genius and to have the opportunity to arrange her own political furniture in her own house.

That "right" has hitherto not been granted to her, that

" opportunity " has not been vouchsafed—because of British preoccupation with the manifest internal differences that would seem to endanger all prospect of continuing unity. The times are too serious for such a " craven fear of being great " to prevent us now doing the right thing by India. Sir Stafford Cripps' mission, in a nutshell, is to make it possible for Indians to feel that it really is " her own house."

Whether in the " larger life of the future " the Indian Commonwealth will be prepared to accept a status similar to that of the Dominions, with representation in London by a High Commissioner, it is too early to say. We cannot count on that. The most that a wise British statesmanship can achieve now is to ensure that this India—for whom geography and cultural affinities ordain the closest communion with China and a future group of Asiatic peoples,—shall not altogether loose the British connection. An independent India does not exclude British collaboration: for many years to come Englishmen—apart from the necessities of war—will be, presumably, giving the benefit of their experience to Indian administrators. But the relationship will have to be one of equal to equal. Events have written *finis* to all the dawdling and dallying. What men ask now is whether Britain has it in her to " enlist India for freedom."* Shall we deserve to retain India as ally and partner in whatever contribution this country still has to make to the world?

*cf. The book with this title by Edward Thompson (Gollancz).

THE CENTENARY OF THE INCOME TAX

By H. E. A. Condon

IN common with most years, 1942 will produce many important centenaries, but it is doubtful whether any of them will be celebrated by the ordinary citizen with a more complete lack of enthusiasm than that of Peel's introduction of the income tax in 1842. The subject touches him in too tender a spot. Moreover, the centenary comes in the middle of a great war which has already forced tax rates up to record levels and extended the area of charge to include some millions of people not previously liable. There is indeed a formidable accumulation of bias which has to be overcome in endeavouring to arrive at a fair judgment of the value of the tax, and yet there is every reason for regarding it as an indispensable tool of victory.

Although we talk of the centenary of the income tax, it is fairly well known that such a tax was first imposed in this country during the Napoleonic Wars. William Pitt was a keen student of Adam Smith, but there is some doubt whether the economist would have approved his pupil turning in his great need to a tax on income. War however applies new tests to established opinions, and so in 1799 Pitt introduced the first British income tax. It was dropped after the Peace of Amiens, reintroduced in 1803, and finally repealed in 1816, following a petition bearing the signatures of 22,000 merchants, bankers and traders of the City of London, and amid the acclamations of the taxpayers generally. The records of the hated tax were to be destroyed, and legend has it that the future Lord Chancellor Brougham himself helped to stoke the fires in Old Palace Yard, Westminster. But in spite of all their care, duplicate records escaped the flames. They remained lost for over a century and have only recently been discovered in the Public Record Office.

Peel had two ends in view when he resorted to an income tax in 1842. He naturally wanted to stop a series of annual deficits, but perhaps more important was his wish to reform the fiscal system so as to create conditions more favourable

for industry and commerce. The tariff needed a thorough cleansing in the interests of that freer trade which was soon to be the national ideal. The price of this fiscal progress was an income tax at the rate of 7d. in the £, which everyone regarded as a temporary measure, to be dropped when the transitional period was over. The nation evinced no great love for the new tax, but soon there was a fairly general agreement that the fiscal changes as a whole had proved profitable to the community and had materially helped to swell the flowing tide of mid-Victorian prosperity. The first judgment on the income tax, therefore, even if conditional, must be accounted favourable.

The Crimean War postponed the prospect of an early repeal of the tax, but the hope was still there. The miraculous 60's, with Gladstone at the Treasury and trade increasing in leaps and bounds, saw the rate gradually reduced until by 1874 it was no more than 2d. in the £. Gladstone even went so far as to offer repeal if desired, believing that "money should be left to fructify in the pocket of the taxpayer," but the trend of events was against him. The cost of the new social programmes, which in varying degrees were now part of every Government's policy, and more particularly the wars—little wars at first, with bigger ones to follow—meant that no Chancellor could afford the sacrifice involved in the abolition of the income tax.

The subsequent history of the tax has shown that it has at least one merit, flexibility. The war in South Africa took the rate up to 1s. 3d., a young man named Winston Churchill remarking with concern in 1902 that this was "the extreme limit of practical peace-time taxation." The naval programme of 1908-9 was largely responsible for Mr. Lloyd George's famous 1909 budget, and so for the beginnings of the super tax. New records were made during the Great War of 1914-1918, which produced a maximum rate of 6s. plus a super tax of 4s. 6d. in the £. The present war scorns even these high levels and has already lifted the income tax rate to 10s. and the maximum surtax rate to 9s. 6d.

When a tax hits one's pocket so severely and so effectively as does the income tax it is extremely difficult to be impartial in judging its merits. Not everyone is capable of the detachment shown by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he replied to his secretary, who had been complaining of the mounting scale of taxes, "Young man, when I pay my taxes, I buy civili-

:ation." But even its severest critics must admit that the tax ıas been exceptionally productive. Possibly that is the real :ause of their criticism. It has been the sheet anchor of successive Chancellors of the Exchequer, and never has its value been more appreciated than at the outbreak of war.

The following table shows how the receipts from the income :ax have grown during the century of its existence, and the potent effect of our wars.

	NET RECEIPTS		
	Income Tax	Surtax	Total
	£ (millions)	£ (millions)	£ (millions)
1842-43	.6		.6
1862-63	10.5		10.5
1882-83	12.2		12.2
1899-1900	18.9		18.9
1900-01	27.6		27.6
1901-02	35.4		35.4
1913-14	43.9	3.3	47.2
1914-15	59.4	10.1	69.5
1915-16	112.4	16.8	129.2
1916-17	186.5	19.1	205.7
1917-18	214.9	23.3	238.1
1918-19	257.7	35.6	293.3
1938-39	336.1	62.7	398.7
1939-40	391.6	69.2	460.8
1940-41	530.8	76.8	607.5
*1941-42	756.	80.	836.

* The figures for 1941-42 are the Budget estimates.

Important effects result from the way in which the rate now varies with personal circumstances and increases with the total income. At first the tax was a strictly proportionate one and the idea of graduation aroused horror. Even John Stuart Mill could remark that, apart from the exemption of necessaries, a graduated income tax appeared to him to be "a graduated robbery." Graduation received an impetus when the super tax was imposed in 1910 at 6d. in the £. Current tax rates would have been incredible in 1910.

Discrimination and graduation are two aspects of a new, modern approach to fiscal problems. In earlier days the main

concern was to raise money with the least inconvenience to the authorities, which normally meant mainly by indirect taxation. But gradually "ability to pay" has come to be recognized as the fairest basis for levying taxes, and this is the justification for the form taken by the modern income tax. Naturally there has been a good deal of opposition, but the principle has made steady progress.

Although "ability to pay" may be more or less accepted in principle, there are quite a number of people who think they are asked to pay too much income tax and turn to possible methods of reducing it. Thus arise the twin subjects of "evasion" and "avoidance", increasing in importance as the rate of tax rises. The two practices shade one into the other at the margins, yet the distinction is reasonably clear. "Evasion" is the avoidance of tax by illegal means; "avoidance" is the evasion of tax without overstepping the limits of the law.

The degree to which evasion is practised is to some extent a matter of opinion, for in so far as it is successful it receives no publicity. The Inland Revenue Department, however, thinks it worth while to maintain an Enquiry Branch specially to investigate suspicious cases, and it has done much useful work. All sorts of tricks have been employed to defeat the law, from duplicate sets of books and false bill-heads to forged share certificates of well-known companies. From time to time a case comes into Court, but on the whole the problem is not an extensive one in normal times. Probably our standards are better than those of most other countries. Certainly I have yet to hear of a case like one which occurred in the East, where a man kept three sets of books—one for his own use, one to show his partner, and one for the Revenue officials. No doubt the Enquiry Branch pays its way, but it is hardly likely that Gladstone would hold to his dictum that an income tax makes "a nation of liars."

"Avoidance" is a more subtle issue. Lord Sumner said in 1928 in the case of *Levene v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue*:—

> It is trite law that His Majesty's subjects are free, if they can, to make their own arrangements so that their cases may fall outside the scope of the taxing Acts. They incur no legal penalties and, strictly speaking, no moral censure, if, having considered the terms drawn by the Legislature for the imposition of taxes, they make it their business to walk outside them.

Many a taxpayer who can afford expert advice has adopted

this point of view and has had a good run for his money. Ingenious devices have been worked out in schemes sometimes so complicated that only another expert can follow their ramifications. The position indeed got so bad that the Chancellor had to step in, and about 20 years ago he started a campaign against avoidance. The legislation dealing with the subject is now extensive and some of it very complex. But there is no doubt of its substantial success. Here again the war is helping, for a sterner note can now be traced in judicial utterances. For instance, in a recent case the Master of the Rolls said:—

> The Section is a penal one and its consequences, whatever they may be, are intended to be an effective deterrent which will put a stop to practices which the Legislature considers to be against the public interest. For years a battle of manœuvre has been waged between the Legislature and those who are minded to throw the burden of taxation off their own shoulders on to those of their fellow subjects. In that battle the Legislature has often been worsted by the skill, determination and resourcefulness of its opponents of whom the present Appellant has not been the least successful. It would not shock us in the least to find that the Legislature has determined to put an end to the struggle by imposing the severest of penalties. It scarcely lies in the mouth of the taxpayer who plays with fire to complain of burnt fingers.

The legal provisions dealing with avoidance raise in an acute form the general issue of the complexity of the law, and the allied difficulty of the language in which it is couched. These are easy game for the critics. Cannot the tax be simplified so that it can be more easily understood by the man in the street? What request could be more reasonable?

There are really two different questions here. A popular explanation of the tax is desirable for the ordinary citizen, and in fact constant efforts are made with that end in view, the latest being the "Income Tax Quiz" and the resort to broadcasting. It is reported that the United States has gone even further, Mr. Walt Disney's "Donald Duck" having been enlisted in order to explain to the many new taxpayers the correct way to fill up the forms. The law itself cannot be made really simple; the subject is necessarily complex. But we must remember Dr. C. E. M. Joad's distinction between the expression of obscurity and obscurity of expression. It would be a hardy individual who would assert that the text of the law could not be improved, for a tax which is the growth of a century necessarily carries a heritage from the past which in some respects is out of touch with the present. As long ago as 1927 the present Prime Minister, then Chancellor of the

Exchequer, appointed an expert committee to codify the income tax. The length of its labours, extending over some nine years, is an indication of the difficulty of its task; and no one would describe the draft Bill which it produced as simple. Simpler, yes; but not simple. And it has not yet proved possible to bring this Bill before Parliament for consideration. The problem remains, and should take a high place in the agenda for the early years of the peace.

I have already stressed the important part played by war in the origin and development of the income tax. In this, as in so many other fields, war seems almost unique in its power as a social cataclyst. It applies not only to the history of the income tax in this country but also to its extension throughout the world. Broadly it would be true to say that prior to the last war the tax was not an important feature in many countries. Money could be raised more conveniently in other ways. Even the United States did not have a federal income tax until 1913, although in her case it was the Constitution which stood in the way. The Great War of 1914-18 however speeded things up and more foreign countries and British dominions and colonies took to the tax. They did not follow our lead blindly, but introduced a number of novel ideas. Notably they have made freer use of the tax as an instrument of discrimination so as to influence the development of industry and to further particular social programmes. One interesting innovation is Sweden's combined Income and Capital Tax, under which the taxpayer's capital is computed and each year a given percentage thereof added to his income, a graduated tax being applied to the resulting total.

In the United States and some of the British Dominions we are confronted by a situation quite outside our own experience —the existence of a federal income tax side by side with state or provincial income taxes. Such a complicated relationship naturally brings its special difficulties, and here again the British income tax system has by comparison a measure of simplicity of which the taxpayer is largely ignorant. Canada has recently gone a long way towards side-tracking this dual system for the period of the war. The Australian Commonwealth wished to adopt a similar policy, but it was not possible to reach agreement between the different parties to the discussion. However, war is once again playing a dominating part and may thus make an agreed solution possible. It will be interesting to watch whether the pressure of war and the

colossal Budget appropriations it has already caused will lead to similar adjustments in the balance of taxing powers as between the Federal and State Governments in the United States.

Wherever we go in the world some income tax problems seem always to be present, the main one possibly being "avoidance", for its roots are deep in human nature. The United States has suffered a good deal in this respect and, as in this country, has had to pass much remedial legislation. "Incorporated yachts" and "incorporated talents" sound strangely to our ears as devices for avoiding tax, but behind these and other unfamiliar terms there is the all-too-familiar attitude of mind of the confirmed tax-dodger, to use the expressive description coined by the popular press. One prominent American authority stresses a further difficulty they have experienced in that an expert can make much more money working for the taxpayer who is trying to avoid his income tax than in working for the government attempting to collect it. He asserts that the influence of this fact, together with the effect of the spoils system, has meant that there have never been enough men of adequate experience at the top of the Revenue Department. In contrast to this state of affairs, he paints the British Revenue Administration in most flattering colours.

The present war has already had an enormous effect generally on income tax in the world. Rates have rocketed skywards, and more countries are finding that they cannot get on without the tax. This accentuates the difficult problem arising out of the double taxation of profits made in foreign trade. Which is the proper body to tax such profits, the country in which they are earned or the country where they are finally received? Both sides have naturally found convincing arguments, and neither wishes to give too much away. As things are the trader sometimes has to pay two or more income taxes on the same profits. It did not matter very much when rates were low, but the burden is now becoming a difficult one to bear. The League of Nations did excellent work in getting countries to work together towards a solution beneficial to all. Its expert Fiscal Committee drew up model agreements which formed the basis of Double Taxation Conventions between many countries. Whilst their scope was sometimes limited, they were a step in the right direction; but there is still a long way to go. Within the British Commonwealth it has been

possible to make much more progress, largely because of the family atmosphere prevailing, in which the British Government was prepared to make fiscal concessions in the general interest.

In spite of its blemishes, it would be difficult to find a responsible statesman who does not realize that the income tax has come to stay. If Pitt and Peel could revisit the scene of their labours they would be astonished at the extraordinary growth of their offspring, but it would not strike them as disproportionate to the general development of society. When they had got over their first shock I think that broadly they would approve. The income tax has served this country well, and never better than in its hour of greatest need. It serves the taxpayer well, even if he is normally blind to the fact. Perhaps some day more people will feel able to say with the late Sir Leo Chiozza Money that their taxation is the best expenditure they make and that they get most satisfaction for it.

THE FUTURE OF FARMING

By H. J. Massingham

THE history of English farming reveals six basic figures who have remoulded the face of England from nature —the peasant, the yeoman, the craftsman, the labourer, the squire and the parson. They translate into human terms the siting and disposition of every authentic village into church-houses-fields, themselves a microcosm of God-Man-Earth. If you look at these figures to-day, you gather that what has happened to each one of them is the same thing that has happened to all. If the old term, *adscriptus glebae*, bound to the soil, be used in its simpler, non-technical sense, it will be seen that all these figures have in course of time ceased to become *adscriptus glebae*. The peasant was jockeyed out of his land by the Enclosures; the yeoman has ceased to have security in his land; the intimate association between land and craft has been broken; for a hundred years the labourer has been leaving the land; the squire and the parson lost the one his personal the other his spiritual responsibility for the village. All of them in different ways became uprooted. There were exceptions, and they were those who carried on the continuity of the tradition. Judging by its results, the term *adscriptus glebae* means something more than a social order which has been disrupted. The three primaries—God-Man-Earth—have been disintegrated and, however imperfectly, the village pattern reflected them. Thus, the term has spiritual and practical implications both; its meanings are æsthetic as well as functional. Good husbandry may be historically called the root of good literature, true piety and the art and craft of living. Peasant, yeoman, craftsman, labourer, squire and parson have been what may be called basic England, and all of them have been separated from the soil.

Consequently, the tradition is at its weakest to-day when a concerted attack is being made upon it. All that it has meant in the development of the authentic national character is not only threatened by a revolutionary movement in high places of

great power and energy, but its elimination is openly advocated. An alliance between the forces of agricultural technology and commercial interests with the bureaucracy as their rather Laodicean supporter has appeared whose professed object in its own words is "to overcome tradition" and be rid of "out-of-date customs which delay progress." The abolition of private ownership in land; the destruction of "nuisance" features in our countryside such as hedgerow timber, copses, hedges, lanes and the like; the abandonment of balanced farming for specialization in crop-production; the unlimited use of machinery and artificials; total nationalization accompanied by the profit motive as the sole stimulus to initiative in agriculture—these proposals are put forward not by irresponsible paper-ideologues but by men of weight and authority in national affairs.

Their advocacy of "larger economic units" represents the last stage, the final act of the 18th and 19th century Enclosures. This formidable body of opinion is flanked by the tenant farmers on the one hand, numbers of whom profess themselves as guided by the cash principle alone ("I don't go in for 'good farming' as some people know it. I just go in for profitable farming and the two are not by any means synonymous," is the way one of them puts it) and by the doctrinaire planners on the other. Their new orders, abstractly conceived from the top downwards, bear no relation to the needs of the countryman, have little or no knowledge of husbandry and look upon it as a mass-producing industry. Thus, the English tradition, as deeply a "part of an Englishman's constitution," as Crawford said of Shakespeare in *Mansfield Park*, is in danger of its death.

The main cause for all this activity against it is not so much the present interdependence between national safety and the production of home-grown food as the dawning realization that at the close of the present war it will not be possible, at any rate for an unforeseen number of years, to repeat the abandonment of our native agriculture at the close of the last. Our foreign investments having been "liquidated," our position will no longer be that of a creditor but of a debtor nation. The urban population will no longer be able to depend upon imported cheap foods as interest-payments upon non-existent foreign loans nor will foreign nations with their fully equipped industrial plant be willing to receive from us exported cheap manufactured goods which they will in future make for

themselves. The conclusion drawn is not a complete revision of an economic system which forced debtor countries into competition with one another for producing food and raw materials out of exploited soils as debt-charges paid off below the cost of production. That is not the end in view; it is the commercialization of our own countryside as a substitute for the loss of profitable fields of exploitation in distant lands, regardless of the examples in the spendthrift wastage of capital resources in soil-fertility, phosphates, timber and the like entailed by it.

The contempt expressed for any and every form of tradition shows quite clearly that it is not only the husbandman who is the object of attack but the whole English tradition, material and spiritual. The revolutionary not only regards the yeoman and the craftsman and the smallholder and the landlord as "obsolete" but English country and the English countryman as Marvell saw them and as, though fallen upon evil days, we see them:—

> Oh thou, this dear and happy Isle,
> The garden of the world erewhile,
> Thou Paradise of the four seas
> That Heaven planted us to please.

Is our native husbandry, on the busy stage of which the actors I have mentioned played parts of such lustre, really obsolete? The whole farming community is to-day almost agreed upon the necessity of the "standard price," fixed by the State for agricultural home-products as the only non-palliative measure to secure the farmer from his ruinous exposure to cut-price competition and alternating booms and slumps, as has been the history of agriculture since the 19th century. This is nothing more nor less than the "just price" of the mediæval guild and country workshop alike.

Many anti-revolutionary land-reformers like Sir George Stapledon and others have stressed decentralization as the first of all agricultural needs, and the nursing of regional centres and nuclei from a foundation of local practice, soil-conditions and human intercourse. Their reasons have been manifold. Locally raised fresh foods are a remedy for faked and sterilized ones and for the notorious malnutrition from which, according to Sir John Orr, twenty millions of our people suffer. The excess profits of dealer and distributor, sometimes five times those of the primary producer, are the effect of centralization and the transport over wide distances entailed

by it, so much so that one wonders whence arose the delusion that the food we eat is really "cheap." It has been costly enough from the points of view of health, security of living and a decent wage for agricultural workers. When the Ministry of Food can be publicly detected (see *The Times*, January 19, 1942) making no resistance to the removal of 95 per cent. of the wheat-germ from its "National Loaf" against the express recommendations of the Medical Research Council, the regional country mill is something more than a pious and "picturesque" aspiration. It is a much more practical proposition than reinforcing devitalized bread with a substitute for the virtue taken out of it. There are, of course many other reasons why regionalism would be of the greatest benefit to the nation—not least it would encourage the revival of a host of local crafts and industries, and so be a means of recharging the moribund village with life.

These are very different proposals from those of the "rational planners" to dump irrelevant industries upon villages and small towns and then urbanize them. But Mr. Trystan Edwards's *Hundred New Towns*, complete with factories and different centres of civic activity and depending on the surrounding countryside for fresh produce, could do nothing but good for the towns and good for the country. The interdependent balance between them is a true modernization of the English tradition, a fulfilment, not a destruction. It is needless to go further than the bare assertion that its husbandry has always been regional and never centralized except through the focal points of market towns.

Three other issues, deeply involving both the past and the future, are so closely intertwined as to make a composite unity. They are the balanced or mixed farm, the health and fertility of the soil and intensive production. That all are characteristics of our traditional husbandry calls for no exposition. The first and second interact for the obvious reason that the mixed farm of arable, pasture, livestock and woodland is the only one which can restore to the soil what it extracts from it, and recognizes the basic wholeness of nature by its own correlation of parts. Nature is the first of farmers; the mixed farm is the nearest to nature.

It is a very curious fact that, though the specialized and mechanized farm actually produces less yield of crops per acre than the mixed farm (large or small) and the small holding, yet output and again output is put forward as the reason for

supplanting the mixed farm by "large-scale economic units." The figures prove it beyond controversy. Recently a table has been published of the production per acre of wheat, barley, oats, potatoes and sugar beet between 1927 and 1936 in eleven countries. In every instance and by wide percentages, the list is headed by Denmark, Holland and Belgium, the type-examples of peasant and yeoman farming, and bottomed by Canada, Australia, the United States and the Argentine, the type-examples of large-scale mechanized farming for profit.

Peasant and yeoman farming is, of course, always intensive (when not crippled by finance and saddled with debt) partly by the stimulus of ownership and partly from that element of personal care and intimate knowledge which a farm run by machines and for profit alone necessarily lacks. It lacks something else as well. A fifty-acre holding properly cultivated and fed with humus has an internal surface equal to one of one hundred and fifty or even two hundred acres, so that throwing a number of small holdings into one large one is actually wastage of soil. Thus, in flouting the traditions of the past, the revolutionaries are mortgaging the welfare of the future, and from this conclusion there is no logical egress.

The assailants of the English tradition, nowadays so vocal and powerful, only refer to the question of values as one merely of "sentiment" and "nostalgia," and so presumably as out-of-date as private property in land, great or especially small. Yet the history of our peasant, our yeoman, our craftsman, squire and village parson have been pregnant with them, inseparable from them. The beauty of our landscapes and villages and little towns chimes with the inward beauty of those who have lived in and upon them, ranging the whole gamut from Shakespeare (who was of yeoman stock) to the ploughman's song. A competitive world riven into chaos and going up in flames would seem to stand in need of that co-operation the peasant expressed not for emergency but in normal usage. A humanity perilously near the automatism of the ant-heap has something to learn from the independence of the yeoman. Is the individual leadership of the squire to be despised (though it is to be admitted he has often been false to his responsibility *for* his tenants) in a world of State absolutism and government by committee? Are the Christian virtues of George Herbert, Charles Kingsley, William Barnes and Chaucer's "povre Persoun" outmoded by the chaos of their denial? Or, if we pass from the man to their work, is

not craftsmanship something of a true antidote to a humanity in bondage to machines?

I take it, then, that the English tradition of which our native husbandry is the base, being as it is true to the nature of the Englishman, is the concern of the future rather than a pleasant tale of the past. The qualities it produced are always in date and only out-of-date at the expense of the human living-power and the national well-being. Time may modify them to meet changes of circumstance but to destroy them is suicidal. We cannot imitate them by "putting the clock back" because we have lost the knowledge and the key to them. What we can do and what the times we live in will compel us to do, if we wish to save modern civilization from collapse, is to recreate the English tradition in a form compatible with certain modern developments which are real and salutary.

Since we have lost the art of self-help, the power of co-operative self-government, we have to call in the State. As this is in itself a confession of failure, it behoves us to invite the State not into the kitchen and the living-room, but to guard the front door against the financial wolves, rather than allow it to turn armed burglar itself, as is the habit of modern States. A very sharp distinction should be drawn between State control and nationalization. The extraordinary bungling of the urban bureaucracy in its dealings with agriculture during the present war and what would seem deliberate attempts to discourage and even suppress such healthy and productive activities as country milling, should warn all countrymen of what they are in for if they yield to the clamour for State ownership of the land. Granted that borrowed money be the worst of all landlords, the next worst is the State, for the simple reason that individual responsibility and so humanity are entirely lacking. It was when the squires became the State in the 18th and early 19th centuries that they acted like savages towards their tenants. Nietzsche called the State "the coldest of all cold monsters," and George Russell called Leviathan Apollyon, as indeed the German State has proved to be. The fact that we have to call it in, therefore, is the measure of what economic babes we have become, "for ever nuzzling at its nipples." To grow up we need some power to chain up the financial man-eater, and, until we do grow up, than the State there is no other power. How should that power be exercized?

The only genuine argument against self-help in feeding ourselves is that we prefer making money to healthy and happy

human beings. But some imports there must be and it is the business of the State to regulate and adjust them to exports so that they shall not interfere with the home market. That implies a drastic revision of an economic system whose object has been to undersell competitors by "a favourable trade balance" of exports over imports that has fomented the diverse evils of economic warfare. Certainly the State would have enough to do without collectivizing husbandry. One of its duties is surely to put an end to land-speculation, especially in building sites, unless ribbon-development is to put out of production an even greater acreage than exists already. A State control that acquired the power of distinguishing between predatory and legitimate "enterprise" and made finance the servant instead of the master of nutrition and husbandry would thereby release them and the English tradition with them from an intolerable incubus upon both culture and cultivation. The provision of credit; the diversion of sewage from polluting the rivers to fertilizing the fields; fostering reclamation; facilitating land-purchase; the regulation of markets; the checking of dishonesty and adulteration in the handling of foods; the maintenance of security for the cultivator; a general supervision of our natural wealth which is our native land, the birthright of free men—these and functions like them but not beyond them are State business. This is no Utopianism nor New Order; it is the removal of obstructions from the right and duty of farmers to farm and the owner-occupier (be he landlord, yeoman or smallholder) to own. If they fail to fulfil that duty by their land, then forfeiture is the right and duty of the State. The function of the State is to encourage its nationals to do as far as is humanly possible without it, so that a vigorous and regional self-government is its true purpose, not a bureaucracy using revolutionary powers to paralyse it.

If the peasantry have been the foundation not only of rural stability but of civilization itself, as history shows it to be, both the labourer and the squire, the ground-floor and top-storey of the rural structure, are the means to its restoration. It certainly cannot be achieved by planning machinery from without. The labourer with his skill, his experience, his all-roundness and knowledge of how to do the right thing at the right time in the right place is the potential by virtue of being the post—or ex-peasant. But there are all too few of him to form the nucleus of a peasantry which, therefore, must be

recruited from the ranks of the younger and willing townspeople by means of an education with a strong rural bias, by dual occupation for the factory-worker, namely the allotment after the factory, and by the use of estates as miniature rural universities. Holiday and training camps on these estates are a means to that fellowship which the Danish Folk High Schools cultivated in its pupils by teaching them craftsmanship, history and literature, and without co-operative marketing in the actual profession of farming, it is impossible for the small man to hold his own. Such communal activities as the jam-making of the Women's Institutes point the same way towards the recovery of the much more than team-spirit of the peasant. And the manorial village farm might well be re-created in a new form by the estate grouped about by family farmers doing seasonal work upon it as a "dual occupation," just as the peasants did week-work and boon-work on the old demesnes. No peasantry can be re-created except on a co-operative basis, and the estate is the natural centre for co-operative labours.

Though nobody says it and everybody talks in the air about democracy, what we are really fighting for is the English tradition, based upon an extremely ancient rural democracy often violated but persisting up to the Enclosures. A recent writer has posed three possibilities before us at the conclusion of the war—the anarchy of the old *laisser faire* of competition for profit, a State despotism on the Communistic model or the Christian life. I should prefer to speak of the third possibility as the English tradition which is Christian and secular both, each irrigating the other. By "secular" I do not mean enclosure by legal compulsion which was both secular and revolutionary. I mean development from within growing up from organic life and those expressions of culture and husbandry which, though secular, were yet influenced by the polarity between the temporal and the eternal. This polarity is not difficult to understand because it was expressed in the English village and small town (church-secular buildings-fields), in themselves a bulwark against the evils of nationalism. Thus, so long as we fight for Christendom, we fight *with* the English tradition.

THE RUSSIAN OUTLOOK

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

FAR from having exhausted itself the Russian counter-offensive by all accounts, including German admissions, appears to be growing in intensity. Its progress has, however, slowed down since the German ortified zone has been reached, and a number of important objectives have till not been attained. Permanent communication with Leningrad has not et been re-opened; lateral communication between the northern and central erman armies has not yet been interrupted; the Rzhev, Vyasma, Smolensk alient still holds; Orel, Kursk and Kharkov remain as German strongholds; ne vital railway running south from Dnepropetrovsk has not been cut and the ermans retain their footing in the Donetz basin about Stalin, on the shores f the Sea of Azov at Taganrog, and in the Crimea.

Yet at all these points the Germans have been subjected to relentless ressure and have been forced to fight desperately under conditions of extreme ardship. They have had to bring up numbers of divisions held in reserve, vhere they were re-organizing and resting preparatory to a renewal of the ffensive in the spring. Even more important perhaps they have been com- elled to use air transport to maintain the supplies of isolated or semi-isolated roups, and in doing so have had to expose their aircraft under unfavourable onditions to Russian attacks, expending material and suffering disproportion- te losses. Although in the ground fighting they have so far been able to etain their hold on the majority of the key points, they have lost an immense umber of subsidiary points with great sacrifice of life and material. It re- nains to be seen whether in the last phase of the winter war the Russians vill succeed in liquidating any considerable number of the key points they losely threaten, and whether their cavalry masses and partizan forces will e able to maintain their attacks on German communication and outlying letachments when spring mud makes major operations impracticable

While it must be admitted that the Russian counter-offensive has not so ar disrupted the defensive front from which the Germans undoubtedly intend o launch a fresh offensive, it has achieved its main object in depriving the *Reichswehr* of a period for recuperation, re-organization and the building up f material reserves. The German infantry in particular has been exposed to mmense strain and it must be doubted whether the troops which have fought he winter defensive battle will be in any condition either in morale or

physically to take part in a spring offensive. It is almost certain that a large proportion of them will have to be withdrawn for a considerable period of rest, and it is doubtful whether even that will restore their morale. It would seem that more than ever the Germans will have to rely on their *Panzer* Divisions if and when they renew the offensive, and it must be admitted that the winter has afforded opportunities of re-equipping and re-organizing these divisions to a greater extent than in the case of the infantry. It may be questionable, however, whether the *Panzer* Divisions retain all their former terrors. Their tactics are now well known and methods of meeting them have been perfected. Moreover, the Russian armoured forces which suffered so heavily in the retreat and in last year's battles have been reconstructed and the Russian Air Force, which even in the most critical period was never driven from the sky, has made great advance both in numbers and the quality of its equipment. The Germans, on the other hand, in the air will be engaged in a two front war, and unless they can produce aircraft of greatly improved performance have little chance of achieving air superiority. To my mind the indications are that even more than last year results will depend on infantry and artillery action. *Panzer* thrusts will court disaster if unsupported by infantry advances, and it will be recalled that many *Panzer* thrusts last year had to halt failing that support, and only escaped complete failure owing to the lack of Russian armoured reserves for counter-attack. The strain that has been imposed on the German infantry this winter may therefore have far-reaching consequences, for there can be little probability that the Germans will be able to produce infantry divisions from their armies of occupation or the armies of their satellite allies of quality equal to those which took part in last year's offensive.

I do not wish to under-estimate the seriousness of the threat that a renewal of the German offensive would mean. German resources and German power of organization are too well known to be discounted, and *Panzer* Divisions employed with initiative and determination must always be formidable. It must be realized, too, that the German starting line has been advanced and that the railway system behind it must by now be fully restored. Even if the heavy winter traffic may have told severely on rolling stock and have entailed the loss of great quantities of motor transport vehicles, the German supply organization will probably be even more efficient than it was last year, unless it is greatly affected by air action and guerrilla activities.

Obviously the German salient in the south is the most threatening part of the German front and presumably that is it that the intensification of Timoshenko's offensive aims at eliminating. Very heavy fighting is in progress there we know from German reports, but little has been disclosed by the Russians as to the nature and progress of the operations, and this equally applies to the Crimea. Elsewhere the most advanced German thrusts such as those that threatened the encirclement of Moscow and the thrust to Tikvi

which might have opened the way for a drive towards the Vologda-Archangel railway, have been dealt with; but the Vyasma-Rzhev salient though heavily threatened still remains, and should it hold out constitutes a threat not only to Moscow but also to the Russian thrusts outflanking it. For since the salient is strongly entrenched it provided a strong base from which to initiate attack. The curiously irregular form which the front of contact has assumed confers in fact advantages on either side which is in a position to make offensive action, and in case of renewal of the German offensive the Russians may deem it advisable to straighten their front and withdraw from some of the areas where they have have penetrated the German defences. It is always a mistake to attach excess importance to gain or loss of ground unless some definite strategic object is involved, and on the whole the greatest achievement of the Russian counter-offensive, should it not gain any further important strategic results, has been the damage it has inflicted on the *Reichswehr* in men and material, in loss of morale, and in depriving it of opportunities for recuperation. Territorial recovery has been much less significant, though of course it was of great importance to relieve Moscow of immediate threat and to deprive the Germans of their footholds at Tikvin in the north, and at Rostov and Kerche in the South.

Great as the Russian achievements have been it is impossible to believe they have been sufficient to compel the Germans permanently to adopt a defensive strategy. A renewal of the German offensive must be expected, but that may not involve a complete abandonment of the offensive by the Russians. It is quite conceivable that we may see each side taking the offensive in those parts of the front where conditions are favourable. The morale and offensive spirit of the Russians have reached such a high level that it is hard to imagine they would willingly revert to a purely defensive attitude, nor are they likely to be again forced everywhere on to the defensive by a surprise onslaught.

We may be certain that the Germans will fight with all their energy, though perhaps with a spirit of desperation rather than with their former confidence, but will the armies they have recruited from their satellite allies show the same spirit? They may prove a source of weakness. Possibly one of the achievements of the winter counter-offensive has been to upset German plans for utilizing services of these auxiliaries. If the Russians had remained inactive during the winter even troops in which little reliance could be placed would have sufficed to hold great stretches of the front, relieving German troops for rest. But evidently it has been German troops who have had to bear the brunt of the fighting and winter hardships. Will it be necessary therefore for the Germans to make more use than they had intended of their allies in the coming offensive? What, if so, will be their value?

Possibly the Germans are hoping for more assistance from their Japanese than from their European Allies. It is hard to believe that Japan will respect her pact with Russia when the German offensive re-opens. Her future is

now so closely linked with that of Germany and Russia that her direct inte vention in the struggle seems inevitable; but has she left her interventi too late? A Japanese attack on Vladivostok last autumn when Russi fortunes were at their lowest might not only have proved a fatal stab in t back, but might have provided Japan with a much more secure base fr which to launch her attack on the Allies in the Pacific. As it is should t German offensive fail that base will be desperately insecure.

Everything points to the coming struggle in Russia being decisive. that the Allied High Command is evidently convinced and fortunately th have on the whole the backing of popular opinion, particularly that of t great masses of munition workers if, possibly, on ideological rather than strategical grounds. Black and depressing as the situation in the Far Ea is the Japanese onslaught may be remembered only as the devastati eruption of a volcano if Germany is defeated.

SQUANDERED SEA POWER

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

SINCE Singapore, Java, Rangoon and New Guinea, Australia is threatened with invasion and the trade of the Bay of Bengal and the communications of the allied armies through the Indian Ocean to Egypt, Persia, ssia and China are open to attack by the surface submarine and air forces the Japanese Navy. Such, in brief, is the present result of the insensate icy of successive British Governments since 1919, abandoning the Two wer Standard of battleship strength, reducing the cruiser forces to the ical figure of fifty ships and the destroyer flotilla to a bare third of what proved necessary to avert defeat in 1917-18, depriving the Navy of its ential air flotilla and neglecting the Merchant Navy. The price we have to pay for this deliberate rejection of all the lessons of long experience the merest dictates of commonsense is heavy: and it is not yet fully paid. far the Japanese have gained ports on the western coast of the Bay of ngal from which to conduct the next stage of their campaign for the overdship of Asia and the Eastern world; the allies have lost their strategical itions, their accumulated supplies of fuel and stores and munitions, their airing establishments—except those minor ones in Calcutta, Colombo and mbay—and their sources of those important raw materials, tin and rubber. e frontiers of the allied navies are now thrown back to Australia and vlon and the forces for attack on both are being marshalled.

The reason for this dangerous development is the loss of sea power. Command of the sea was the indispensable foundation of security in the East, as s elsewhere for this maritime Empire, and command of the sea is acquired l held by sea power, which, in its turn, is an amalgam of three constituents ea fighting forces, positions and shipping. The positions are held by land l air force and these are maintained and nourished by constant reinforcent and replacement by sea, requiring shipping to carry the men and terials and fighting ships to secure their safe passage. Superior sea power uld have prevented the movements of those considerable military forces ich have overrun Malaya, Burma and the islands of the Indies.

A massing of cruiser forces, Dutch, American and British, was attempted order to stem the invasion of Java. The allied squadron met the enemy nsport fleet, protected by a strong naval force. The result of that action s the loss of thirteen allied warships, including five cruisers. It is impossito close our eyes to the fact that the Japanese won a notable victory, and

though the allied air forces took a toll of the transports it was insufficie
to effect reductions in the landing forces which overwhelmed Java.

Victories at sea are—as they are elsewhere—the outcome of concentratio
of superior force. The high purpose of the strategist is so to dispose h
forces that there shall be superior force at the essential point at the require
time. The enemy aims at forcing a dispersion of effort, and one of th
familiar means is the use of comparatively small forces against the trad
routes which constrain the opponent to devote far more numerous units f
their defence. It is most profoundly to be hoped that the allies are not di
persing their forces or mistaking their true objects but it is not easy to unde
stand why a larger force was not available in the Sea of Java to meet th
invasion. The attack on Pearl Harbour caused heavy losses, but it can hard
have put out of action the whole of the fine cruiser fleet of the United State
a fleet numbering some thirty-seven vessels many of which were of a powe
ful type. The Japanese have spread their efforts very widely and have th
communications of several armies to maintain—in Indo-China, Malaya, Jav
Borneo and New Guinea. Their cruiser forces appear to consist of no mo
than twenty-five ships, though there is some uncertainty as to what m
have been added after the severance from the League and the cessation
the transmission of information as to building. But the escorting squadro
of some of these expeditions do not appear to be large, except perhaps th
of the invasion of Java, and it is disturbing to read of a small cruiser for
bringing troops to Rabaul and landing them unopposed except by such a
craft as the Australian Air Force could throw against them.

There can be little doubt that an attack on the mainland of Australia
intended and will soon begin and that it will not be the only attack. T
possitions which the Japanese have acquired in Burma will enable them
employ heavy ships, submarines and aircraft in the Bay of Bengal. Wh
we remember the effects upon the trade of Calcutta and Madras of the br
appearance of the *Emden*, a single small cruiser hunted continuously
superior British forces, we can readily imagine the effects that this situati
will produce. The ocean trade of the ports of Calcutta, Madras a
Vizagapatam, and the coastal trade which plays no small part in the dist
bution of goods along the Coromandel coast will now move in safety o
if there is a sufficient naval force of all arms to protect it, and the protecti
will only be possible if that force retains its base, Trincomali. It is good
hear (*The Times*, March 13) that the reinforcement of the military and aer
defences of Ceylon had begun as early as last November and has been p
ceeding; but with the examples of Singapore and Java before us, and t
knowledge of the numbers at the disposal of the enemy and his willingn
to accept heavy losses, we cannot close our eyes to the need of meeting h
at sea with an adequate combined naval force of all arms. The great obj
must be to prevent his obtaining a foothold and this is the essential busin

seafighting forces on the surface, under and above the surface. Japanese craft have already made their appearance over the Andaman Islands where useful little harbour of Port Blair, defenceless against any attack in force, uld be available as an advanced base both for military operations against ylon and sea operations against the trade of the Bay.

No position, in fact, is more vital at this moment than Ceylon, and in no sition is the strongest possible sea and air force more needed. For the panese intentions reach across the Arabian Sea to Aden and the possession the base in the centre of the Indian Ocean is indispensable. With that in eir hands the attack so much desired by the Axis partners upon the supply es of the Egyptian, Persian and Russian armies would be formidable, for ere are many small island anchorages to the westward of India which would ve as supply positions for surface submarine and aerial forces operating the coast of Africa. The Secretary of State for Air tells us that he still is his faith upon the policy of bombing the industrial districts of Germany d the occupied countries, but we may reasonably ask which course will ve the allied cause best—the infliction of such injury as we have hitherto en able to cause to the output of warlike material for the German armies, the establishment of command of the sea without which the armies of ourlves and our allies cannot fight and would be forced out of their positions the Near East. Singleness of purpose is the one and only road to success war and singleness of purpose demands the definition of an object. What ould be the object of the maritime allies? Surely it should be that which s always been the object of the maritime coalitions and alliances of hich this country has been a partner—to obtain, first and foremost, the comand of the sea without which we ourselves cannot receive the very means our existence or the materials of our war industry, without which we cant send the munitions to our Russian and Chinese allies or maintain our mies in those positions that enable our fleets to act in distant waters, reinrce our allies or provide diversions of the enemy's strength. Command of e sea is the foundation stone on which our future efforts must be built and ithout which no future efforts are possible. If resources and forces that e capable of contributing to the acquisition and maintenance of command sea are directed, while that purpose remains unfulfilled, to some other ject, they are wrongly employed. The idea that one of the national arms ould act independently, pursuing an object different from that of the others d of its own choice, attempting an offensive which does not contribute to e principal object, or does so in a minor measure only, is a strategical error the first magnitude. The armies in Libya and the Middle East are conbuting directly to the command of the sea, but it is very difficult to say that is is the outcome of much of the bombing of Germany. It is well thin the bounds of possibility that a fraction of the efforts in that direction ring the last three months might, if applied to the Eastern theatre, have

enabled Malaya and the Dutch islands to hold out for a longer period.

If dissipation of force upon a number of different objects is a strateg sin of the first order so too is squandering of either force, opportunity time. There has been all too much squandering in the war at sea, both in preparation and prosecution. What was it but sheer squandering, in form of failure to take proper precautions to make Scapa Flow a sec anchorage for our fleet, that lost us the *Royal Oak*? Foolish people, at the ti belittled the loss, saying that we and our French ally were so vastly superio the then enemy that the loss of that one battleship hardly affected situation. We should give a good deal to have another battleship to-d The pernicious glossing over of that loss was one of the many mistakes the same order whereby the public has been encouraged to take things ea and been allowed to retain its confidence that all will be well without exertions of its own. No less was it a squandering to send an inferior fo into Narvik in the first attack upon the German flotilla in that port, a fo unsupported by a heavy ship. It proved possible, in the second attack, send a far stronger destroyer force with a battleship. How much better have had the foresight to do this on the earlier occasion! It was squander to send an aircraft carrier out to hunt submarines. Thereby the *Courage* was lost in a most foolish form of employment—a form which has not b repeated; but must we learn all our lessons at the cost of hundreds of li and of indispensable and valuable units of the fleet? So too it was squand ing to send the other aircraft carrier the *Glorious*, into the North Sea w no other protection than a couple of destroyers at a time when there v nothing to prevent enemy heavy ships being at sea. So she and her esc were sent to the bottom with a grievous loss of life by the enemy's he cruisers for the want of an elementary amount of precaution.

The attack on the French battleships at Oran was another form of squ dering. Unlike the capture of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, to whic was compared, even at its utmost it promised no more than the removal port from the French battlefleet; it did not touch the cruiser, destroyer submarine forces of France. In its final result it reduced the French N by one battleship and by 2,000 men, while on the other side of the bala sheet it caused a great revulsion of feeling against this country. Friends was squandered, and the effects stretch far afield, to our detriment. Dakar we squandered both force and opportunity. A recent Ameri visitor to French West Africa writing in *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1942) made these observations:

> There seems a general agreement by most persons, the British included, that action was a gigantic error. The intelligence work of the Free French must have singularly inept and the judgment of the British most misguided. But the unpardon sin was to fail to finish what was started. If the attempt to take Dakar was to be m at all, it should certainly have been carried through to completion regardless of loss

)ne cannot dispute the criticism, one cannot fail to compare the whole ceeding with those of the Germans and the Japanese who begin by making ple preparation and then carry the operation through to a finish. For not y was the whole thing marked by a want of decision but even the element- precautions of giving clear and categorical instructions to prevent rein- cements from reaching Dakar, and of sending an adequate force to enforce se instructions, were not taken.

:omparisons are certainly odious. We may compare the preparations of Japanese for landing troops, with great numbers of properly equipped ding craft and men thoroughly trained in the operation, with our own nplete neglect in the same direction, although amphibious operations have ariably been needed in our strategy. Nor had we any sufficient force of st attack ships for the bombardment of coastal positions with high angle of heavy pieces of artillery. The old bomb ketch was always needed and monitor was her modern successor; it has fallen to the battleships of the diterranean fleet to provide this form of support to the army and this they e done at a risk from submarines. Fortunately the Italian submarines ed to interfere seriously with the attacks, but with the coming of German marines of a greater efficiency we have lost the *Barham*, a severe blow at a e when we need every possible heavy ship in the Eastern seas. We may npare too the extensive and careful preparations made by the Germans the protection of the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen* by aircraft their run from Brest to the North Sea with the absence of any similar operation between the sea and air forces when the important convoy orted by the *Illustrious* and *Southampton* had to run the gauntlet of the ilian Channel; whereby the aircraft carrier was so damaged as to be out action for months and the cruiser was lost. Such want of foresight and paration are no less forms of squandering than those cited earlier. If we to pull through this struggle we cannot afford to squander the irretriev- e assets of material, opportunity and time.

AFTER THE WAR—WHAT THEN? By Viscount Samuel

On page 175 of the March number the first sentence of the last paragraph should read:

> We have the Committee of the Cabinet on Reconstruction which for the time being has been obliged to give a great part of its attention to questions that will be the most urgent of all when the war stops.

The confusion of this paragraph with the penultimate one was due to a last minute deletion made necessary by the Government changes announced after the article had gone to press.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

AT such a time as we are living in, journalism seems to count almost m
than book writing—and is of course something different—team w
not individual effort. The best known newspapermen of this cen
(we know them by titles now) have either not been writers at a
only in a very secondary degree. Yet one or two journalists proper h
earned for themselves a reputation which stood out defin
as a literary achievement. Mr. Wickham Steed is an
stance, yet in his case it was the range of knowledge
insight that mattered rather than the writing; to my thinking only
political journalist of my generation has been conspicuous and influe
first and foremost as a writer. Garvin made the *Observer* a great paper,
to do that involved the forming and direction of a team. But I have kn
no other newspaper which depended so greatly on the writing of one m
To make the achievement fully individual, and stamped as much as any b
with a personality, it was necessary that the writer in question shoul
also the editor.

Mr. J. L. Garvin

For a matter of fifty years now work of mine has been appearing up
down the English press, but my feeling of strong personal attachment
out chiefly to two journals, one of which was the *Spectator* in the day
Hutton and Townsend. There was never to my mind a better weekly,
St. Loe Strachey who ultimately succeeded to the two old associates he
to make it what it was. But it was in essence their paper, not his. The
men were completely unlike each other, yet somehow a composite person
evolved, and imposed itself even on outside contributors. Very little appe
in the *Spectator* that was not characteristic—but characteristic of the pa
I remember Sidney Colvin assuring me (and he valued himself on cri
acumen) that an article which I had written was by old Townsend. A
very great compliment I thought it. But in the *Observer* during the y
when I wrote for it weekly about Ireland, there was no possibility of
taking the editor's own manner. He had indeed abandoned the whole
ception of impersonal comment and signed his columns; yet there never
writing which less needed to be so labelled: it was personal to the poin
extravagance, and its power was such that one seemed to assist at an ath
exhibition. Beyond all doubt the exhibition was popular and admired—
deserved to be. It was the work of a writer who expressed himself
plosively because he felt explosively and was never only half in earnest
there was uncertainty in his mind, his first care was to let you know
uncertain was the possibility of reaching a sure conclusion. Yet a contrib
whom he trusted got the freest of hands. When I had to write about
Black and Tans, and the Irish Republicans, and the numerous unplea
happenings which marked that period, I cannot recall that he ever used
blue pencil or cautioned me.

His interest was always chiefly, but never exclusively, politics. Betw
1897 and 1899 when he was only getting into his stride as a publicist, he

tributed four articles to The Fortnightly. Three of them had to do with Ireland, directly or indirectly; one was about Parnell's death, two about the New Unionism—in other words about Chamberlain. But the first of the four was a study of a poet to whom not many critics have given attention—Coventry Patmore. I have known few men whose opinion I should value more on any work considered purely as literature; especially if it were in verse. It is not surprising that the daughter who has been for years now closely associated with his editorial work should be primarily a poetess.

In the course of this century the Sunday papers have invaded what up to 1910 or thereabout was the domain of the weeklies: and if blame is the proper word, Mr. Garvin should be chiefly blamed for this. He made of the *Observer* something that gave us news on a day when there were no dailies, but gave also the sort of careful comment both on politics and on literature, for which we had turned to the *Spectator* and to the *Saturday* or the *Nation*. And certainly the paper as he made it had no less right to rank as literature than any of these famous weeklies. He has left the editorial chair after close on five-and-thirty years; but we are not done with Mr. Garvin. For that richly stored memory and athletic brain there is harvest to be brought in of a kind which cannot be gathered except by uninterrupted, undivided concentration. Team work is done with, and perhaps leadership, but there remains work that may be slower in effect, yet may last longer.

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War-time Pamphleteering

Existing conditions and chiefly the paper shortage, tend to produce a type of book not unlike the old fashioned quarterly article. A single subject treated in a small separate volume has the chance to attract many more readers than any of the reviews command; and this weighs heavily when the purpose is propagandist. So, from various publishers, there comes to us this handful: *Polish-German Problems*, by Robert Machray (Allen and Unwin, 4s. 6d.); *The American Primer*, by Dorsha Hayes (Bodley Head, 4s. 6d.) and *Propaganda's Harvest*, by Kingsley Martin (Kegan Paul, 1s.). Mr. Machray gives us 56 pages (with a folding map); Miss Hayes, 119; Mr. Martin, 64; roughly, allowing for variety of type, the scope in all is the same. Mr. Machray should well repay careful reading for a serious student; but it has to be recorded that he is not easily read. On the other hand, nothing could be more brightly written than Miss Hayes's "Handbook on the American Way of Life." She buttonholes her readers, or rather, she gets on friendly conversational terms with her audience; for one has the impression of being part of a group addressed by a fully-qualified spell-binder. No undue strain is put on the intelligence of the public for which she writes—that is to say, the hundred and odd millions of her fellow citizens who accept, at least nominally, what is written in the American Declaration of Independence. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." Well, without going further she has to admit that America's treatment of negroes does not square with that. Yet she does not bring together, as perhaps she might, this declaration and the facts of inequality to which she makes much too vague allusion. In short, she and Mr. Machray appear to have failed somewhat, but in different directions, when they approached the eternal problem of keeping a balance between generalities and detail. Either of them might with advantage consider how Mr. Kingsley Martin goes to work; his *Propaganda's Harvest* is a model of this kind of pamphleteering—if that is not a disparaging term to

apply to the series called "The Democratic Order" which Mr. Fran Williams edits. Mr. Martin, who may be placed as an editor in the same cl with either Mr. Garvin or Hutton and Townsend, reviews the part wh propaganda played in the last war and the last attempt at an internatio settlement, and he urges vehemently that in this war fuller powers sho be given to the Minister charged with this department. In short he wa Mr. Bracken to decide, after hearing what the fighting services have to s how much information should be given to the public, and how soon - ever his decision runs against the wish of army, navy or air force. Apart fr such questions of detail, is the general strategy of the department and M Martin insists that the way to shorten our path to victory is to let all Eur know what the Allies intend—carrying the already published outline of t Atlantic Charter so much further that even Germans may realize that Hitle defeat may bring to them also a more reasonable world. His review of L Vansittart's contribution to this discussion is excellent in sense and in temp

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Dickens and England

The next book that lies before me is far removed from all thoughts of w time pamphleteering or political journalism. Yet Dickens began as journalist, and for that matter was more effective propaganda than almost all other writers put togeth What is more, it may be said that when Mrs. Lamb ton Becker writes her *Introducing Charles Dickens* (published here by Har at 10s. 6d.) she is contributing to that work for "Anglo-American und standing" in which her daughter and fellow-worker, Mrs. Warde, is fu engaged. Proceeds of the American edition have already provided a F Cross ambulance bearing the name of 'Charles Dickens'; royalties from t one will go (through the Dickens Fellowship) to the relief of small distres Londoners. All this, I think, should be stated, in fairness to those who w to drag Dickens, from whatever region he now inhabits, to be an ally generous purposes in this battle. He would have jumped at the chan and nobody else ever made such surprising use of the least promising opp tunities. But, for all that, it is amazingly difficult to relate the imagin England which Dickens created to the England which is fighting this w Trollope's people, Thackeray's people, Hardy's people—it is easy to see th in khaki: Mr. Pendennis and his friend George Warrington would h looked well as company or platoon commanders; but somehow all this ar of character-parts which Dickens conjures up, though they are Engl enough, heaven knows (no other country could have produced them) fitted so precisely to the circumstances in which and for which they w created that one can hardly separate them from a world which had the l scarcely to guess what war might be. Certainly a regiment can have characters, and as a rule has them; but uniform makes for uniformity; I cannot see Sam Weller, or Sam's creator, in any sort of uniform, or of c formity. Mrs. Becker has a great yarn to tell and tells it with spirit; facts about the life of Dickens beggar even his own invention. Some of th will be new probably to many readers—as for instance that Thackeray (yet an author) proposed himself for the job of being illustrator, which w to "Phiz". She makes us feel that Dickens lived in the eye of the world l royalty—and consequently that intimate details of his life were regard specially by himself, as matter for public explanation. When the man w had written with such moving pathos about the magic of home, found

cessary to separate from the wife who had borne him ten children, natur-
y there was talk; but Dickens felt it obligatory to issue a manifesto, and
arrelled definitively with the *Punch* owners because they would not publish
is document. Yet there was nothing to reply to: Catherine Dickens made
protests. In the *Dictionary of National Biography* Carlye is quoted writing
Emerson: "No crime and no misdemeanour specifiable on either side;
happy together, these two, good many years past, and they at length end
" "They" here is characteristic; it means, as Carlyle would think it
ould mean, "he": Mrs. Dickens certainly did not contribute anything to
e decision but some tears. Yet it does not appear that Dickens was in-
enced by a desire to commit either "crime" or "misdemeanour"; he
nply found his wife's presence tedious—and therefore bad for his work.
s home had to be a radiant centre, full (literally and metaphorically) of
:rlet geraniums flourishing and well-tended. Mrs. Becker ingeniously
ises Gadshill into a sort of emotional centre; the home towards which
ckens always aspired and which, after his usual fashion he attained and in
iich he died. He had just left his work to contemplate the new conserva-
ry which he had added, to house his geraniums, when he dropped suddenly,
d that was the end. And it seems that the tunnelled way which led from the
ing room under the crowded Dover Road to his study in the garden is now
he best air-raid shelter in Kent." Yet Dickens is worth a deal more than
at in wartime; his work must be for thousands the best shelter from the
mbardment of formidably bad news.

'HE POETRY OF MATTHEW ARNOLD. A Commentary by C. B. Tinker & H. F. Lowry. *Oxford University Press.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

This book rises to the category of seful works. Its interest is there-
ore curious and in detail. The uthors' virtues are scientific, and he aim of the work is to leave the eader to deduce what aesthetic onclusions his intelligence and im-gination may permit from the vidence offered by this comment-ry. The design of the work is set ut in the preface.

> We have prefixed no introductory essay dealing with the development and and cessation of Arnold as a poet because that is, in effect, the unifying subject of the book, however fragmentary and disunited it may at first appear. A reading of our remarks on 'Resignation,' 'Rugby Chapel,' and 'Obermann once more', for example, will give a person who has not time or inclination for the perusal of the entire volume an adequate notion of what we conceive to be the relation between Arnold's poetry and his philosophy of life, as well as of his inevitable transition from poetry to prose.

Let us do as they suggest, and examine their notes on the famous poem *Resignation*. First, they place it in its various appearances in his early volumes. Such bibliographical matter is important in an examination of Arnold's work, for the process throws much light on his self-criticism. We see, from his hesitancy, his temperamental changes of mind about the merits of his poems, his pluckings out and readmittances of certain poems in edition after edition, his alterations during the course of such parental fussing, how this is indicative of the shallow roots of his poetic and creative energy, and how something else forbade those roots to take a fundamental hold of his nature. What that something else is we will find out in a moment.

After that, the commentators collect all possible evidence of the sources of the poem. This, of

course, means going back over the poet's early reading, environment, friendships; in fact, everything that a conscientious biographer would collect before beginning to write a 'life.' We see how Lucretius (a dominant influence over Arnold's personality), Senancour, the *Bhagavad Gita* and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* were influential in the making of this poem. The young man, still in his twenties, already finds Goethe's later work, the fruits of disillusion and experience, compatible.

Here, then, is the evidence neatly laid out by our commentators for a judgment upon Arnold's work and personality. And this specific instance in the matter of one poem is consonant with the impression which the whole book makes upon one's mind. We see Arnold, still a youth, admonishing his sister Jane (whom he calls Fausta) for being ruled by too impetuous a romanticism and yearning after excitement. He takes her for a walk in the Lake District, where they once went with a party ten years ago, in childhood. He recalls the meeting with some gypsies, and contrasts their free, spontaneous, irresponsible lives with the life of the poet, to find them antithetical. That in itself is odd enough in a young man, whom one might expect to be boiling with the witches' brew of adolescence and newly discovered literary ability. But no, Arnold is already obsessed with the fear of extravagance, of those flights of egoism which made Shelley an angel and Blake a prophet. Arnold, at this early stage, is already steeled to a more ascetic purpose. His father's iron discipline has been so successful that there is no way for the poet to throw off that moral armour and to throw up his arms to the skies in a gesture of freedom and rebellion. Instead,

> The Poet, to whose mighty heart
> Heaven doth a quicker pulse impart,
> Subdues that energy to scan
> Not his own course, but that of Man.

All this is very premature. The resignation is surely precocious. It is as though the young poet has lived through the seven ages of man within two decades, and is already settling into the grey scepticism and coldness of old age. He is already tired of life, and sees its vanities with that "sad lucidity of soul" to which he refers, in a characteristic phrase, later in the poem.

We know, too, that four years later, in the preface to his third volume, he proclaims his poetic creed. It is a dissertation on the text of seeing "life steadily and seeing it whole," a famous phrase which he had already coined. He asserts that what matters in a poem is the architecture and the subject matter, and not the expression and embellishment. That is profoundly true. But a young poet can discover that truth too soon. He needs first to sow his wild oats. And this Arnold never did. The result is that his flowers are perfect, but few. They grow on stony ground, on ground frozen beneath the shadow of his grim father's moral upbringing. We see Arnold with his note book making deliberate plans for poems to be written as his time table permits! It is a chilly sight. The cold creeps into the reader, as it crept into Arnold's maturing consciousness. Too late he discovered that though he had been *thinking* and *talking* poetry, he had been *living* prose.

These speculations arise from only one item in this gold mine of a book. You see how rich it is in material. A scholar and lover of poetry and the making of poetry should be duly grateful for it.

RICHARD CHURCH

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL ORDER, by William Temple, Archbishop of York. *Penguin.* 6*d.*

THE MORAL BLITZ, by Bernard Causton. *Secker & Warburg.* 2*s.*

THINGS I LIVE BY, by The Bishop of Lichfield. *Cambridge University Press.* 6*d.*

The project of publishing small but important new books at the price of sixpence to bring them within the range and the notice of the railway bookstall public now receives triumphant and even spectacular vindication as a real public service. Dr. Temple's *Penguin* appears almost simultaneously with his appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury, and anybody can now discover the views of the new Primate for the modest price of sixpence. They are, he would say, not his own views so much as the inevitable social consequences of Christian doctrine. "I believe that every Christian ought to endorse the substance of what I have so far said," he writes on page 75. Up to that point he has said that the Church has a right to interfere in social policy; that, more, it has a positive duty to interfere; he has laid down in what this 'interference' consists, and still more in what it does not. It does not consist, he says, in the formation of any Christian political party, nor yet in the urging of particular techniques upon those responsible for framing policy. He has laid down most clearly what are the primary and the derivative Christian social principles, and their natural order and priority of application. Above all, he allows no reader to forget for one moment that human sin lies at the heart of the whole problem, and that therefore the art of government is the art of directing potential murderers, thieves, and tyrants, since all men are subject to original sin. Hence any form of Utopianism is

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explicitly unchristian. Then at the end, he puts off the mitre of a bishop and writes as a private citizen his own proposals of what ought to be done:

> At the end of the book I shall offer, in my capacity as a Christian citizen, certain proposals for definite action which would, in my private judgment, conduce to a more Christian ordering of society; but if any member of the Convocation of York should be so ill-advised as to table a resolution that these proposals be adopted as a political programme for the Church, I should in my capacity as Archbishop resist that proposal with all my force, and should probably, as President of the Convocation, rule it out of order.

His proposals are contained in an appendix of sixteen pages, but the matter in them is far too closely knit and argued for any summary of them to be fair. They are their own summary. In the meantime anyone who will spend sixpence to find out the mind of the new Archbishop ought to arise from his exploration full of hope. Never have the *Penguin* people laid us all more deeply in their debt.

Mr. Causton casts his net over a wider area. His field is world politics, and the key to their future in the inter-relationship of Britain and Germany. He knows Germany really well, and has many rather illuminating things to say about such matters as the real significance of Niemoller, in the course of which he destroys a number of legends. His affirmation is that this war is indeed a war about Christianity, but that we who defend it can only effectively do so by giving to the world an example of Christianity in action. "England can save Europe better by her example than by her precepts," he ends by declaring, and this, after all, is simply the best Johannine theology. But for action we must first understand the real issues of the conflict and the bearing of English speaking Christendom upon them, and it is here that Mr. Causton has many helpful things to say.

The Bishop of Lichfield is one of the best of all religious broadcasters, and his six five-minute talks in the "Lift Up Your Heart" series will not easily be forgotten by those who heard them. Here they are in pamphlet form, and they certainly bear reading again.

ROGER LLOYD.

MEN AND POLITICS, by Louis Fischer. *Cape.* 18*s.*

It is futile to say that everyone should read this book. At the price of eighteen shillings they certainly will not. I challenge Mr. Allan Lane to put it in the *Penguins.* I will, however, say that it is the moral obligation of every journalist and publicist to read it.

Not that Mr. Fischer has so much that is new to say. On Russia, which he first visited in 1922, he merely confirms with even fuller documentation what we had already learned from the consensus of journalists who had been there for years, Chamberlin, Lyons, Cholerton; as well as from the Russians themselves who could escape to write, such as Souvanin, and from Koestler, Muggeridge, Van Paasen, Citrine and the rest. Against these have to be placed the Webbs, with their intimate knowledge of blue-book Russia, and tourists' impressions of working Russia, the Slavophil enthusiasm for Russia of Pares, the judgment of a briefed lawyer such as Pritt, and Strachey's mystical belief in the rightness of the people at all times. Mr. Louis Fischer is a life-long, tough American Left-winger of the militant and militaristic type, who fought in what he calls the Republic's Holy War in Spain. But he does not realize that propaganda is not reporting, but killing the enemy with lies—with

acts if that way is better, but with ies if necessary. The trouble with im is that he is honest even in his artizanship. He respects the evi-ence.

His opinion of the Rykov-Bukharin-Yagoda trial was that it vas a "frame up." There are in-leed three choices with these urges. Either the prosecution was ight and the founders of the Bol-hevik revolution were traitors and coundrels; or the prosecution vas lying and Stalin is a scoundrel; r Stalin regards it as unim-portant whether he is a scoundrel r not, provided that the régime nder Stalin goes on. The third hoice is probably the correct one. t is also possible to hold that oth Bukharin and Stalin thought hat some kind of accommodation vith the Germans would be militar-ly necessary; and that Stalin first ut his opponents 'on the spot' and hen adopted their policy.

What then, in Left-winger Mr. Fischer's opinion is the character of his régime for which so much shall e sacrificed?

> Millions of Soviet citizens live lies every day to save their lives and their jobs. They make false confessions day in and day out. They write lies, speak lies. They lie to one another and know it. They lie to themselves and get accustomed to it. They lose their illusions and succumb to the sole cynical goal of self-preservation until a better day. The assassination of character and the annihilation of personality is the dictatorship's chief weapon which it never forgets. The further a Soviet citizen is from the centre of the régime the less he gets its blows. The peasants are least exposed to it. The workers more. The officials much more. And for the highest officials like Rykov, Yagoda and Krestinsky the destruction of personality and character took the intensified, telescoped form of trial and confession. The wonder of it is that so few confessed.

These men, isolated from comparisons save with the Tzarist



Still needing speed and accuracy and concentration, but working now in the fresh air instead of in a city office . . . *She's* one of the people who may no longer need

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régime, fought bravely against the invader and Hitler, as the Germans fought bravely for the opposite dictatorship—and the Moors fought most bravely of all. Mr. Fischer comments: "The more primitive the man, the less his fear of death" —shall we rather say "the less the worth whileness of life"?

And so, what? Here Mr. Fischer comes to a stop, becomes negative. Britain should have gone to war for Czechoslovakia, although "indeed Czechoslovakia itself was divided."

> Neville Chamberlain was a sincere pacifist on general religious and humanitarian grounds but chiefly because he feared the effects of war on the British social system . . . . Chamberlain feared the death of his England in a war.

Should one negotiate with Hess? Or, since the people wants the Stalin-Communist system through Europe, with all the one-party hierarchy that this involves, is it not best that this should come? It will be Cæsarism: Julius came as a proletarian hero. So were most of the tyrants. But this system will probably improve the material condition of the common man. Spiritual liberty is independent of régimes. Only civil liberty is sacrificed. Ability will have as compensation what the neo-Marxist Webbs called 'the vocation of leadership.' If the *lumpen-proletariat* prefers it so, why not be content to lead? There is a systole and diastole in history, when men turn from liberty to authority. Not by words about liberty, but only in the bitter experience of tyranny, will men be brought to recognition of their follies and to understanding of what liberty means. Meanwhile, in the antithesis of this dialectic 'leadership' may have effected some revolutionary class changes for the world's good. Or shall we take neither of these routes, but let the crazy Europeans murder each other, not by our ritual but in their own ways? Shall we first gather together our own spiritual strength, find our own souls before we instruct others, and associate with us those like-minded for peace and freedom against the idolization, as superhuman, of subhuman violence and the cult of passion?

However, in all these ultimates Mr. Fischer, brilliant journalist though he is, gives no guidance unless it be: 'let us detest Stalin but fight by his side against Fascism.' The remorseless 'either-or' of politics he has not considered. "The martyred masses of Europe," he writes, "are not likely to display any eagerness for a Soviet dictatorship in place of the Nazi dictatorship." But, although we shall agree with the principle, there seems to me more hope than cutting edge to the conclusion:

> The idea of a new practicable international nationalism for peace and of a more civilized and more representative democracy in Britain would have an explosive effect on the European Continent.

Mr. Fischer is an individualist caught in the toils. He has not yet completed his philosophy. Perhaps the wisest remark is at the beginning of the book. "No one wins a war. Who won the San Francisco earthquake?"

GEORGE CATLIN

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